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WorkBuddy 数据目录迁移（junction）

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly coherent, but it permanently redirects all WorkBuddy data and contains broad deletion behavior that could erase an existing target folder if run in the wrong state.

Install or run this only after backing up the current WorkBuddy data folder and confirming that the chosen target path, such as E:\workbuddy-data, contains nothing you need. Be especially cautious when rerunning after a reinstall, because the script may treat the recreated C: folder as the source and delete the existing target directory. Avoid using the reference-file rm -rf or repeated rmdir cleanup notes except with a verified exact path and a backup.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The manifest explicitly advertises moving an application data directory via a Windows junction and claims it requires no administrator privileges, but it provides no warning about file-system side effects, rollback considerations, or the risk of redirecting future writes to another volume. This is dangerous because users may trigger persistent storage redirection without understanding data integrity, backup, privacy, or application-compatibility implications, increasing the chance of accidental data loss or unsafe system changes.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The document explicitly recommends bypassing a 'safe-delete' interceptor with `rm -rf`, which normalizes evasion of protective controls around deletion. Even though this is framed as a troubleshooting note, it can encourage destructive cleanup behavior without sufficient warning, validation steps, or rollback guidance.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
- `cmd.exe`'s child processes (including node) may **NOT inherit `C:\Windows\System32`** in PATH.
  So `tasklist`, `robocopy`, `fsutil`, `mklink`, `rmdir` called by bare name → `ENOENT`.
  They DO exist at `C:\Windows\System32\*` — call them by full path.
- A "safe-delete" interceptor may sit in front of deletions. node `fs.rmSync`/`unlink` can
  **time out**; Git-Bash `rm -rf` bypasses it.

## Failure timeline
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding
rmSync`/

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
## Leftover cleanup note

After a successful junction, an old `.workbuddy_old` may remain partially locked (EPERM) because
a live process holds handles. `cmd /c rmdir /s /q` several passes removes most; the last few
thousand locked files only clear after a reboot. None of it is used by WorkBuddy (the live data
is on E: via the junction). Just delete the folder in Explorer after rebooting.
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
rmdir /s /

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
scripts/migrate.js:45