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Security audit

Inworld TTS

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward Inworld.ai text-to-speech wrapper, but users should avoid sending confidential text and should protect the API key.

Install only if you are comfortable sending the text you synthesize to Inworld.ai. Use a narrowly scoped API key, avoid putting secrets or private content in the text, and store the key in a protected secret store or a permission-restricted env file rather than a general shell profile.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/tts.sh:38
Finding

Unvalidated CLI Arguments Permit JSON Request Injection

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
&2; exit 1; } [[ "$TEMP" =~ ^([0-9]+([.][0-9]+)?|[.][0-9]+)$ ]] || { echo "Invalid temperature" >&2; exit 1; } awk -v value="$RATE" 'BEGIN { exit !(value >= 0.5 && value <= 2.0) }' || { echo "Speaking rate must be between 0.5 and 2.0" >&2; exit 1; } awk -v value="$TEMP" 'BEGIN { exit !(value >= 0.1 && value <= 2.0) }' || { echo "Temperature must be between 0.1 and 2.0" >&2; exit 1; } PAYLOAD=$(jq -n \ --arg text "$TEXT" \ --arg voice "$VOICE" \ --arg model "$MODEL" \ --argjson rate "$RATE" \ --argjson temp "$TEMP" \ '{ text: $text, voice_id: $voice, audio_config: { audio_encoding: "MP3", speaking_rate: $rate }, temperature: $temp, model_id: $model }') ``` Also validate voice and model identifiers against documented formats or an allowlist when possible. Reject missing values for options such as `--voice` before attempting to read `$2`. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
SKILL.md:21
Finding

Documentation Encourages Persistent Plaintext API-Key Storage Without Safeguards

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (10)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

md
## Setup

1. Get API key from https://platform.inworld.ai
2. Generate key with "Voices: Read" permission
3. Copy the "Basic (Base64)" key
4. Set environment variable:

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill clearly instructs users to run shell commands and execute a script, but its metadata declares no permissions or allowed-tools scope. That creates an authorization and transparency gap: an agent or user may not be warned that shell capability is required, increasing the chance of unintended command execution in environments that rely on declared tool scopes for safety.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documentation describes converting arbitrary text to speech through Inworld's API but does not prominently warn that provided text is transmitted to a third-party service and that generated audio is saved to disk. This omission can lead users to expose sensitive or regulated content without informed consent, especially in agent settings where prompts may contain private data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

This POST request sends supplied text content to an external endpoint along with an authorization header, creating a clear data egress path to a third party. While expected for a TTS integration, it is still a genuine security concern because sensitive content may be exfiltrated without meaningful notice or policy enforcement.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tts.sh (reported line 55)May include surrounding context.

sh
)

if [[ "$STREAM" == "true" ]]; then
  curl -s --request POST \
    --url "https://api.inworld.ai/tts/v1/voice:stream" \
    --header "Authorization: Basic $INWORLD_API_KEY" \
    --header "Content-Type: application/json" \

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The script transmits arbitrary user-provided text and an API credential to a third-party cloud TTS service, but provides no explicit warning, consent step, or data-sensitivity guardrails. In a skill context, users may pass secrets, personal data, or proprietary prompts assuming local processing, so this creates a real confidentiality risk even though the network transmission is core functionality.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

md
if [[ "$STREAM" == "true" ]]; then
  curl -s --request POST \
    --url "https://api.inworld.ai/tts/v1/voice:stream" \
    --header "Authorization: Basic $INWORLD_API_KEY" \
    --header "Content-Type: application/json" \
    --data "$PAYLOAD" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

md
if [[ "$STREAM" == "true" ]]; then
  curl -s --request POST \
    --url "https://api.inworld.ai/tts/v1/voice:stream" \
    --header "Authorization: Basic $INWORLD_API_KEY" \
    --header "Content-Type: application/json" \
    --data "$PAYLOAD" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tts.sh (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

sh
if [[ "$STREAM" == "true" ]]; then
  curl -s --request POST \
    --url "https://api.inworld.ai/tts/v1/voice:stream" \
    --header "Authorization: Basic $INWORLD_API_KEY" \
    --header "Content-Type: application/json" \
    --data "$PAYLOAD" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tts.sh (reported line 65)May include surrounding context.

sh
if [[ "$STREAM" == "true" ]]; then
  curl -s --request POST \
    --url "https://api.inworld.ai/tts/v1/voice:stream" \
    --header "Authorization: Basic $INWORLD_API_KEY" \
    --header "Content-Type: application/json" \
    --data "$PAYLOAD" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The non-streaming request also transmits user-controlled text and uses the API credential in an outbound request to Inworld.ai. This is not code-injection, but it is a real confidentiality and policy issue because the skill enables external transmission of potentially sensitive content.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tts.sh (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

sh
| jq -r --unbuffered '(.result.audioContent? // .audioContent? // empty)' \
    | base64 -d > "$OUTPUT"
else
  curl -s --request POST \
    --url "https://api.inworld.ai/tts/v1/voice" \
    --header "Authorization: Basic $INWORLD_API_KEY" \
    --header "Content-Type: application/json" \

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.