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Security audit

SkedGo TripGo API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent TripGo API helper skill, but users should treat API keys and travel/location data as sensitive when running its scripts.

Install only if you trust TripGo with the travel, location, trip, and webhook data you send. Keep TRIPGO_API_KEY private, prefer the default official HTTPS API URL, do not set TRIPGO_BASE_URL to untrusted hosts, and use the webhook allowlist rather than the unsafe bypass except for controlled debugging.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/configuration-available-regions.sh:12
Finding

TripGo API Credential Disclosure Through Unrestricted Base URL Overrides

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
&2 exit 1 fi ``` 3. **Validate the hostname against an explicit allowlist** Parse the URL using a robust URL parser and require the normalized hostname to match an approved TripGo host or explicitly configured enterprise deployment. Do not rely on substring matching, which can accept names such as `api.tripgo.com.attacker.example`. 4. **Separate custom endpoints from credential forwarding** Never attach `X-TripGo-Key` to an untrusted destination. Resolve and validate the destination before constructing the authenticated request. 5. **Constrain curl protocol and redirect behavior** Use settings such as: ```bash curl --proto '=https' \ --proto-redir '=https' \ --max-redirs 0 \ --fail-with-body \ --silent \ --show-error \ ... ``` If redirects are required, validate every redirect destination before forwarding authentication headers. 6. **Avoid API keys in command-line arguments** Remove or discourage `--api-key`, because command-line values may be exposed through process listings and shell history. Prefer a protected environment variable, secure file descriptor, or secret manager. 7. **Fail closed on placeholder credentials** Scripts using values such as `YOUR_API_KEY` or `your-api-key-here` should reject those placeholders explicitly rather than transmitting them. 8. **Apply the validation centrally** Introduce a shared request helper that validates the scheme and hostname and adds authenticatio ...[truncated 439 chars]
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (93)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The description presents a broad, comprehensive TripGo API integration covering routing, public transport, trips, and location services. The supplied code chunk, however, only performs one narrow action: creating a travelling tourist problem via the deprecated /ttp/ endpoint using a fixed example payload. While this does access the TripGo API, it does not substantiate the broader declared capabilities such as routing, public transport data retrieval, trip management, or geocoding. This is a material scope mismatch between the declared purpose and the actual behavior of the provided code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The declared description presents a broad multimodal journey-planning and location-services interface for the TripGo API. The supplied code chunk instead performs one specific action: deleting a Travelling Tourist Problem by ID through a deprecated endpoint. While it does interact with the TripGo API, its primary purpose is materially narrower and different from the declared functionality. This is a description-behavior mismatch because the code does not provide the described routing, public transport, trip, or geocoding capabilities, and instead exposes a specific delete operation not reflected in the description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The declared description presents the skill as a broad interface for journey planning, public transport, trips, and geocoding. The supplied code instead implements one very specific deprecated endpoint for retrieving a travelling tourist problem solution from /ttp/{id}/solution. That specialized optimization/problem-solving capability is materially different from and narrower than the declared purpose, and the accessed resource family (/ttp) is not reflected in the description. Therefore the description does not accurately represent the actual behavior of this code chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 44)May include surrounding context.

md
- `SKILL.md`: This file.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/geocode-search-and-autocompletion.sh (reported line 134)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo "Making request to: ${URL}"
echo ""

curl -s -X GET "$URL" \
    -H "Accept: application/json" \
    -H "X-TripGo-Key: ${TRIPGO_API_KEY}" | python3 -m json.tool

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/trips-removes-a-hooks-from-a-trip.sh (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

sh
#!/bin/bash
# Remove a Hook from a Trip
# DELETE /trip/hook/{id}

set -euo pipefail

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/ttp-delete-travelling-tourist-problem-deprecated.sh (reported line 4)May include surrounding context.

sh
#!/bin/bash
#
# Delete Travelling Tourist Problem (Deprecated)
# DELETE /ttp/{id}
#
# Deletes the problem of the provided ID.
# This is optional as problems expire automatically.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

This skill is explicitly designed to transmit requests, including the X-TripGo-Key credential, to an external service and allows the base URL to be overridden via TRIPGO_BASE_URL. That creates a real exfiltration and SSRF-style risk if an attacker can influence environment variables or configure the skill to send secrets to an untrusted host; the optional unsafe webhook bypass further increases exposure in webhook-related flows.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

md
To use this skill, you must set the following environment variables:

- `TRIPGO_API_KEY`: Your TripGo API key (header: `X-TripGo-Key`).
- `TRIPGO_BASE_URL`: (Optional) Base URL for the API. Defaults to `https://api.tripgo.com/v1`.
- `TRIPGO_WEBHOOK_ALLOWLIST`: (Optional, recommended) Comma-separated allowlist of webhook domains (e.g. `example.com,webhooks.example.org`).
- `TRIPGO_ALLOW_UNSAFE_WEBHOOK`: (Optional, default `false`) Set to `true` to bypass webhook allowlist checks for trusted/manual debugging only.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/configuration.md (reported line 38)May include surrounding context.

| X-TripGo-Key | API key (required) | | Content-Type | application/json |

Curl Example

bash
curl -X POST "https://api.tripgo.com/v1/regions.json" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/configuration.md (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

| X-TripGo-Key | API key (required) | | Content-Type | application/json |

Curl Example

bash
curl -X POST "https://api.tripgo.com/v1/regionInfo.json" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This skill directs outbound communication to an external domain, which creates a real data-exfiltration surface because requests may contain API credentials and potentially sensitive trip, stop, and timing data. While contacting a vendor API is expected for this skill, the risk is still real and should be treated as an external transmission boundary requiring review and user awareness.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/public-transport.md (reported line 7)May include surrounding context.

Base URL

text
https://api.tripgo.com/v1/

Authentication

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The routing documentation instructs users to send precise coordinates, waypoint history, habitual locations such as home and work, and itinerary timing to a third-party API, but it provides no privacy warning or data-handling caution. In a journey-planning skill, this omission increases the risk that integrators will unknowingly transmit highly sensitive location data without user notice, minimization, or consent controls.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The webhook feature states that the platform will POST tripID and tripURL to a registered external URL, but it does not provide an explicit warning about data sharing, retention, or third-party exposure. Because trip URLs may grant access to trip details and may correlate with user travel behavior, sending them to arbitrary endpoints creates a real privacy and potential unauthorized-access risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The documented trip APIs include analytics and tracking-related capabilities such as planned/progress/log URLs that extend beyond the manifest’s stated scope of journey planning, public transport, and geocoding. This scope expansion increases privacy and data-governance risk because an integrating agent could collect or transmit user behavior data without users expecting those functions from this skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/configuration-available-regions.sh (reported line 94)May include surrounding context.

sh
# Make request
echo "Fetching available regions..."
curl -s -X POST "${TRIPGO_BASE_URL}/regions.json" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -H "X-TripGo-Key: ${TRIPGO_API_KEY}" \
    -d "$REQUEST_BODY" | jq '.'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/configuration-tsps-per-region.sh (reported line 83)May include surrounding context.

sh
# Make request
echo "Fetching TSPs for region: ${REGION}..."
curl -s -X POST "${TRIPGO_BASE_URL}/regionInfo.json" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -H "X-TripGo-Key: ${TRIPGO_API_KEY}" \
    -d "$REQUEST_BODY" | jq '.'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/locations-pois-for-map-region-using-cell-ids.sh (reported line 68)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo ""
echo "Making request..."

curl -s -X POST "https://api.tripgo.com/v1/locations.json" \
  -H "Accept: application/json" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-TripGo-Key: ${TRIPGO_KEY}" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/public-transport-departure-timetable-for-a-stop.sh (reported line 102)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo "Making request to $ENDPOINT"
echo "Request body: $BODY"

curl -s -X POST "$ENDPOINT" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-TripGo-Key: $API_KEY" \
  -d "$BODY" | jq '.'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/public-transport-details-of-a-route.sh (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo "Making request to $ENDPOINT"
echo "Request body: $BODY"

curl -s -X POST "$ENDPOINT" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-TripGo-Key: $API_KEY" \
  -d "$BODY" | jq '.'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/public-transport-operators-for-a-region-or-group-of-regions.sh (reported line 99)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo "Making request to $ENDPOINT"
echo "Request body: $BODY"

curl -s -X POST "$ENDPOINT" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-TripGo-Key: $API_KEY" \
  -d "$BODY" | jq '.'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/public-transport-real-time-information-for-a-service.sh (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo "Making request to $ENDPOINT"
echo "Request body: $BODY"

curl -s -X POST "$ENDPOINT" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-TripGo-Key: $API_KEY" \
  -d "$BODY" | jq '.'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/public-transport-routes-for-a-region-or-operator.sh (reported line 117)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo "Making request to $ENDPOINT"
echo "Request body: $BODY"

curl -s -X POST "$ENDPOINT" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-TripGo-Key: $API_KEY" \
  -d "$BODY" | jq '.'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/public-transport-services-for-a-route.sh (reported line 91)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo "Making request to $ENDPOINT"
echo "Request body: $BODY"

curl -s -X POST "$ENDPOINT" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-TripGo-Key: $API_KEY" \
  -d "$BODY" | jq '.'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/routing-a-to-b-to-c-trip.sh (reported line 103)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo "$JSON_payload" | jq '.'
echo ""

curl -s -X POST "${BASE_URL}/waypoint.json" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -H "Accept: application/json" \
    -H "X-TripGo-Key: ${TRIPGO_API_KEY}" \

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.