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Security audit

飞书审批

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is coherent and not deceptive, but it can change real Feishu/Lark approval workflows without built-in confirmation guidance.

Install only if you intend agents to operate on Feishu/Lark approval data. Require your agent or workflow to ask before any write action such as approving, rejecting, canceling, transferring, adding signers, sending reminders, or rolling back approval tasks.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill exposes high-impact approval operations such as cancel, approve, reject, transfer, add_sign, and rollback, but provides no warning, confirmation guidance, or safety constraints around their use. In an agent setting, this increases the risk of accidental or socially engineered state-changing actions against real approval workflows, especially because these APIs can alter business process outcomes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The user-facing description and operational guidance are written entirely in Chinese, which effectively imposes a language choice without documenting that the skill is Chinese-only or offering an alternative. Under the policy, a fixed language is acceptable only when explicitly justified or offered as an opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.