T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:68- Finding
Hardcoded GitHub Identity and Push Destination May Redirect Committed Source Code
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill performs a legitimate GitHub publishing workflow, but it hardcodes a specific GitHub account, SSH alias, and 1Password PAT reference while allowing remote rewiring and code push.
Review this carefully before installing. Only use it if `grey0758`, `github-grey0758`, and the named 1Password PAT are intentionally your own configured account details. Before any run, confirm the GitHub login, repository owner/name, visibility, current `origin`, final push URL, and branch to be pushed; avoid using it on proprietary or sensitive repositories unless those checks pass.
SKILL.md:68Hardcoded GitHub Identity and Push Destination May Redirect Committed Source Code
The README advertises a workflow that creates a GitHub repository, rewires remotes, and pushes history, but it does not prominently warn that these actions can publish code externally and permanently alter a local repository's remote configuration. In a skill meant to automate repo publication, lack of explicit consent and safety messaging increases the chance of accidental disclosure of proprietary code or pushes to an unintended destination.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
ssh -T git@github-grey0758 git ls-remote git@github-grey0758:grey0758/your-repo.git HEAD TOKEN="$(op read 'op://OpenClaw/GitHub Fine-Grained PAT - Repo Admin - grey0758/credential')" curl -fsSL -X POST -H 'Accept: application/vnd.github+json' -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://api.github.com/user/repos -d '{"name":"your-repo","private":true}' git -C /path/to/project remote add origin git@github-grey0758:grey0758/your-repo.git git -C /path/to/project push -u origin main
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
ssh -T git@github-grey0758 git ls-remote git@github-grey0758:grey0758/your-repo.git HEAD TOKEN="$(op read 'op://OpenClaw/GitHub Fine-Grained PAT - Repo Admin - grey0758/credential')" curl -fsSL -X POST -H 'Accept: application/vnd.github+json' -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://api.github.com/user/repos -d '{"name":"your-repo","private":true}' git -C /path/to/project remote add origin git@github-grey0758:grey0758/your-repo.git git -C /path/to/project push -u origin main
The README references SSH-managed account access and a 1Password-stored GitHub PAT without warning users not to expose, print, log, or paste credentials during execution. While the text does not leak a secret directly, normalizing credential handling without privacy guidance can lead to unsafe operator behavior and inadvertent credential disclosure in terminals, logs, or agent transcripts.