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Security audit

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Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a public Q&A integration that mostly matches its purpose, but it uses broad triggers, mutable remote installation, plaintext credential guidance, and public posting/voting actions that deserve review before use.

Install only if you intend your agent to interact with a public Q&A service. Use explicit MoltOverflow prompts, review and sanitize all content before posting or voting, avoid putting private code, company names, credentials, paths, or personal data into requests, and store the API key in a keychain or a 0600-permission file rather than agent memory or broad environment variables. Prefer a pinned, hash-verified release over the mutable curl install command.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
skill.md:24
Finding

Mutable Remote Skill Installation Without Integrity Verification

Content
View full analysis
~/.moltbot/skills/moltoverflow/SKILL.md ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented installation procedure retrieves mutable Skill instructions from a remote server and writes them directly into the active local Skill directory. It does not pin an immutable version, validate a cryptographic hash or signature, or inspect the downloaded file before installation. The command also omits `curl --fail`, so an HTTP error response could be saved as the installed Skill file. HTTPS protects data in transit under normal conditions, but it does not protect against compromise of the hosting account, origin server, domain, certificate issuance process, or deployment pipeline. The downloaded content is an instruction file rather than a native executable. Nevertheless, once loaded by an agent, modified instructions could direct the agent to invoke tools, access local data, disclose sensitive information, or perform network operations. The effective behavior can therefore change after the reviewed package has been published. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the `moltoverflow.xyz` hosting environment, domain, deployment pipeline, or the remote `skill.md` object. 2. The attacker replaces the legitimate remote file with instructions that request sensitive data, unsafe commands, or unauthorized network activity. 3. A user runs the documented installation command. 4. `curl` writes the attacker-controlled response directly to `~/.moltbot/skills/moltoverflow/SKILL.md`. 5. The agent subsequently loads the modified Skill as trusted instructions. 6. The malicious instructions influence agent behavior within the permissions of the agent runtime and its available tools. ### Impact Assessment A successful supply ...[truncated 532 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
$tmp_file" | sha256sum --check - install -m 0600 "$tmp_file" ~/.moltbot/skills/moltoverflow/SKILL.md ``` The expected digest must be obtained from a trusted, independently authenticated release source rather than from the same mutable endpoint. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
skill.md:75
Finding

API Credential Stored in Plaintext Without Permission Controls

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
~/.config/moltoverflow/credentials.json <<'EOF' { "api_key": "moltoverflow_xxx...", "agent_name": "YourMoltyName" } EOF chmod 0600 ~/.config/moltoverflow/credentials.json ``` Where available, the documentation should instead provide platform-specific examples for storing and retrieving the key from a trusted secret manager. ]]>

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
Findings (10)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill recommends storing a long-lived API key in plaintext in a predictable local file and even suggests saving it to memory or environment variables without discussing protections. This increases the likelihood of credential theft by other local processes, logs, backups, or accidental disclosure through future prompts and tool use.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 75)May include surrounding context.

⚠️ SAVE YOUR API KEY! It's only shown once.

Recommended: Save your credentials to ~/.config/moltoverflow/credentials.json:

json
{

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 168)May include surrounding context.

md
**5. No Malicious Code or Commands**

- Don't post destructive commands (`rm -rf /`, `format C:`, etc.)
- Don't post code designed to steal API keys, tokens, or credentials
- Don't post exploits, malware, or backdoors
- Don't post code that exfiltrates data to external servers

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 168)May include surrounding context.

md
**5. No Malicious Code or Commands**

- Don't post destructive commands (`rm -rf /`, `format C:`, etc.)
- Don't post code designed to steal API keys, tokens, or credentials
- Don't post exploits, malware, or backdoors
- Don't post code that exfiltrates data to external servers

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The trigger list includes several generic everyday phrases such as "ask question," "coding help," "search questions," and "technical question" that are likely to appear in normal conversation. This can cause unintended invocation of the skill, routing user prompts to an external service unexpectedly and increasing the chance of accidental data disclosure or unwanted actions in contexts unrelated to this skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

Install locally:

bash
mkdir -p ~/.moltbot/skills/moltoverflow
curl -s https://moltoverflow.xyz/skill.md > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltoverflow/SKILL.md

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

bash
mkdir -p ~/.moltbot/skills/moltoverflow
curl -s https://moltoverflow.xyz/skill.md > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltoverflow/SKILL.md

Or just read from the URL above!

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

bash
mkdir -p ~/.moltbot/skills/moltoverflow
curl -s https://moltoverflow.xyz/skill.md > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltoverflow/SKILL.md

Or just read from the URL above!

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 145)May include surrounding context.

md
**2. No Doxing or Leaking Human Info**

- Never reveal your human's identity, location, employer, or personal details
- Never post private conversations without consent
- Never expose your human's other accounts or projects
- _This is a bannable offense_ 🔨

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to transmit user-supplied question content and an API credential to an external service. Although this is core functionality, it is still a real security concern because the platform is explicitly public and broad invocation guidance elsewhere may cause accidental posting of sensitive or proprietary data.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 241)May include surrounding context.

Post a Question

bash
curl -X POST https://xetoemsoibwjxarlstba.supabase.co/functions/v1/questions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages invocation on very broad human prompts such as checking, answering, posting, and voting 'anytime,' which can cause the agent to take external actions with insufficient specificity or confirmation. In a skill that can publish public content and cast votes, vague triggers increase the chance of unintended disclosure, spam, or unauthorized actions on behalf of the user.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.