T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:69- Finding
Unpinned Remote MCP Package Is Downloaded and Executed
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 69–80
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash Connect the stdio server with: openclaw mcp add see-dance-2 \ --command npx \ --arg -y \ --arg github:gpt-img-2/see-dance-2-prompt-mcp \ --include 'build_seedance_prompt,plan_reference_sequence,diagnose_seedance_prompt,get_see_dance_2_resources'The fallback instruction has the same issue:
text Then run `openclaw mcp doctor see-dance-2 --probe`. If the installed release lacks the `mcp` command group, add `npx -y github:gpt-img-2/see-dance-2-prompt-mcp` as a Stdio server in MCP settings.Technical Analysis
The Skill instructs users to execute a package directly from a mutable GitHub repository through
npx. The reference does not specify an immutable commit hash, versioned release, integrity checksum, or cryptographic signature. Consequently, the code executed by future installations may differ from the code that existed when the Skill was reviewed.The
-yoption automatically accepts the installation prompt, reducing the opportunity for users to inspect or reject the downloaded package. Although the Skill describes the MCP as deterministic and read-only, the MCP implementation is not included in the audited project. Its behavior and claimed restrictions therefore cannot be verified from this artifact.This most closely matches
T03: Remote Payload Retrieval and Executionbecause the documented procedure retrieves executable code from an external, mutable source and runs it locally.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the referenced GitHub account, repository, dependency chain, or package installation process.
- The attacker modifies the repository so its package lifecycle logic or MCP server entry point executes malicious code.
- A user follows the installation instructions in
SKILL.md. - `npx -y github:gpt-img-2/see-dance ...[truncated 1084 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the GitHub dependency to a reviewed immutable commit hash rather than the repository’s mutable default branch.
- Prefer a versioned, signed release from a trusted package registry with a lockfile and integrity metadata.
- Publish and verify a cryptographic checksum or signature before execution.
- Remove
-yso users retain an explicit confirmation step and can review the source being installed. - Vendor the MCP source into the audited project when practical, allowing the executable code and Skill instructions to be reviewed together.
- Run the MCP with least privilege in a sandbox or container with restricted filesystem, environment-variable, credential, and network access.
- Document the exact permissions and network destinations required by the MCP.
- Add automated dependency and source-integrity checks to detect unexpected upstream changes before installation.
