T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:66- Finding
Unpinned Remote MCP Package Retrieval and Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 66-79
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution through a mutable GitHub dependency
Risk Level: Highbash Connect the stdio server with: ```bash openclaw mcp add oxvodo \ --command npx \ --arg -y \ --arg github:gpt-img-2/oxvodo-prompt-mcp \ --include 'build_motion_prompt,plan_reference_sequence,diagnose_media_prompt,get_oxvodo_resources'Then run
openclaw mcp doctor oxvodo --probe. If the installed release lacks themcpcommand group, addnpx -y github:gpt-img-2/oxvodo-prompt-mcpas a Stdio server in MCP settings. The MCP is optional; never imply it ran when unavailable.text ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions cause `npx` to retrieve and execute code directly from the mutable GitHub repository `gpt-img-2/oxvodo-prompt-mcp`. The dependency is not pinned to an immutable commit SHA, exact verified release, or integrity digest. As a result, the code executed by future users can differ from the code reviewed during this audit. The `-y` option automatically accepts the installation prompt, reducing the opportunity for users to inspect or reject the retrieved package. Package installation hooks and the MCP server process may execute arbitrary code under the privileges of the user running OpenClaw. Although the MCP integration is documented as optional and no malicious payload is embedded in the audited file, the command establishes a remote code-execution channel controlled by an external repository. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the referenced GitHub repository, its maintainer account, or the dependency publication workflow, or a malicious upstream update is introduced. 2. The attacker modifies the repository package, entry point, installation hook, or transitive dependencies to include malicious code. 3. A user follows the instructions in `SKILL.md` and runs the supplied `openclaw m ...[truncated 1150 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the GitHub dependency to a reviewed, immutable full commit SHA rather than a branch or repository default:
bash npx github:gpt-img-2/oxvodo-prompt-mcp#FULL_AUDITED_COMMIT_SHA - Prefer publishing the MCP package through a trusted registry and require an exact version rather than a range or floating tag.
- Distribute and verify cryptographic checksums, provenance attestations, or signed releases before execution.
- Remove
-yso users must explicitly approve package retrieval and can review the resolved source and version. - Pin and audit transitive dependencies with a committed lockfile, and use automated dependency and provenance scanning in the release process.
- Run the MCP server in a sandbox with minimal filesystem access, a restricted environment, no unnecessary credentials, and limited outbound network access.
- Document the package's required permissions and data boundaries so operators can apply least privilege.
- Require users to review the pinned source before configuring it as a persistent Stdio server, and provide a process for securely updating to a newly audited revision.
- Pin the GitHub dependency to a reviewed, immutable full commit SHA rather than a branch or repository default:
