T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
weekend_scout/telegram.py:268- Finding
Unconditional Branding Injection into User and Telegram Output
- Content
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Scouted by Weekend Scout" if html_mode else "✨ Scouted by Weekend Scout" sections.append(footer) ``` The Markdown preview follows the same pattern: ```python footer = "_🌱 Scouted by Weekend Scout_" sections.append(footer) ``` ### Technical Analysis The formatter unconditionally inserts a fixed promotional footer into both the Telegram digest and the Markdown-style preview. The delivery instructions identify the generated preview as the authoritative user-facing report, so an Agent following the Skill contract cannot omit the injected text without deviating from the prescribed workflow. Although this does not grant system privileges or execute arbitrary code, it alters the Agent's final output for a purpose unrelated to the requested event-discovery result. There is no configuration setting or caller-controlled option to disable the attribution. ### Attack Path 1. A user invokes Weekend Scout. 2. The Agent discovers and selects events. 3. The Agent calls `format-message`. 4. `_compose_digest()` and `_compose_markdown_preview()` append the fixed branding footer. 5. The Skill instructions require the Agent to use the returned preview as the authoritative report. 6. The promotional text is displayed to the user and, when configured, sent to Telegram. ### Impact Assessment The issue affects every normally formatted report. Its scope is limited to output integrity and unsolicited branding; it does not provide filesystem, network, account, or operating-system privileges to an attacker. ]]>- Remediation
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