Back to skill

Security audit

Recipe Share Event Materials

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a simple Google Workspace recipe for sharing a Drive file with calendar attendees, with a real privacy caveat but no hidden or malicious behavior found.

Before using this skill, review the calendar attendee list and the file sensitivity, especially for external guests, groups, or forwarded invitations. Grant access only to intended recipients and remove permissions afterward if the sharing was temporary.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to share a Google Drive file with all calendar event attendees but does not warn that attendees may include external guests, large distribution lists, or unintended recipients. In a productivity context, this can easily cause accidental disclosure of private or internal documents because the action grants access directly to every email address on the event.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.