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Security audit

super-product

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Chinese-language guide for using a Super Productivity command-line tool, with a normal but unpinned Python package install risk.

Install this only if you intend to use the Super Productivity CLI and are comfortable with it modifying your task-management data. Prefer installing the Python package in a virtual environment, verify the package source yourself, and be careful with delete/edit commands because the skill documents real data-changing operations.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:10
Finding
Unpinned and Unverified Third-Party Package Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 10–14 **Vulnerability Type**: Supply-chain risk from an unpinned third-party dependency **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown ## 安装 ```bash pip install super-productivity-cli ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill directs users or agents to install `super-productivity-cli` directly from the default Python Package Index without specifying an exact version, validating cryptographic hashes, using a lock file, or documenting verified package provenance. Consequently, the installed artifact and its transitive dependencies may change after the skill has been reviewed. The package implementation is not included in this project, so the behavior executed during package installation and subsequent invocation of the `sp` command cannot be verified through this audit. If the package publisher account, distribution infrastructure, or a transitive dependency is compromised, a malicious release could be delivered through the documented installation command. Source distributions may execute package-controlled build logic during installation, while malicious wheel or dependency code could execute when the installed CLI is invoked. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package publisher, package repository distribution path, or one of the package's unconstrained transitive dependencies. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under the expected package name. 3. A user or agent follows `SKILL.md` and runs `pip install super-productivity-cli`. 4. Because no version or hash is specified, pip resolves and downloads the currently available package and dependencies. 5. Attacker-controlled code executes during an applicable source build or when the user subsequently invokes the installed `sp` command. 6. The malicious code operates with the privileges of the account running pip or the CLI. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation ...[truncated 522 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin the dependency to an exact, reviewed version rather than installing the latest available release: ```bash pip install super-productivity-cli==<reviewed-version> ``` 2. Generate and maintain a dependency lock file that pins all transitive dependencies. 3. Require cryptographic hashes during installation, such as by using a hash-locked requirements file with `pip install --require-hashes`. 4. Document the package's verified official repository, publisher identity, expected package index, and release provenance. 5. Review package source and dependency changes before updating the pinned version. 6. Install the package in an isolated virtual environment under a non-administrative account. 7. Prefer reproducible, signed, or internally mirrored artifacts where operationally possible.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The manifest description and the visible documentation are entirely in Chinese, which implicitly constrains interaction and usage guidance to a specific language. The file does not offer an alternative language, user opt-in, or a justification that this skill is intentionally region-specific.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.