GoAI PDF to PPT

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: May 29, 2026 · 9:29 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.1

Overview

The skill mostly does the advertised PDF-to-PPT conversion, but it sends documents to GoAI and automatically opens the generated PowerPoint, so users should review it carefully before installing.

Install only if you are comfortable sending the selected PDF or PDF URL to GoAI for processing. Avoid confidential, regulated, or internal-only documents unless GoAI is approved for that data. Be aware that successful conversions are saved locally and automatically opened, which is the main reason this is in Review rather than benign.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Behavioral AST: exec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (5)

subprocess module call

Medium

• Category: Dangerous Code Execution

Content

elif system == "Linux":
            subprocess.run(["xdg-open", path], check=True, capture_output=True)
        elif system == "Windows":
            subprocess.run(["start", "", path], check=True, shell=True, capture_output=True)
    except subprocess.CalledProcessError:
        pass

• Confidence: 96% confidence
• Finding: subprocess.run(["start", "", path], check=True, shell=True, capture_output=True)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The skill states that local PDFs are uploaded and remote PDF URLs are passed through to an external GoAI service, but it does not require a clear user-facing disclosure or consent step at the time of use. PDFs often contain sensitive business or personal data, so silent transmission to a third party can cause confidentiality and compliance issues.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The code accepts a local path, reads the file, obtains a signed remote upload URL, and uploads the file contents to a third-party service with no built-in user-facing disclosure or confirmation at the point of transfer. In a skill that converts PDFs/images via an external API, silent upload of local files can expose sensitive documents if the caller does not clearly understand that local content leaves the host.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: This function performs the same pattern for arbitrary supported local files, including PDFs, by resolving a path and uploading its bytes to a remote signed URL without any warning in this code path. Because this skill's core purpose is document conversion, users may provide sensitive PDFs; sending them off-host without explicit disclosure increases confidentiality and compliance risk.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 88% confidence
• Finding: The code downloads remote content from a URL and writes it directly to disk, creating directories as needed, without any user-facing warning or integrity/content validation. In this context, the output is expected to be a generated presentation, but unvalidated remote content can still overwrite user-selected paths or place unexpected files on disk, which is risky when handling remote service responses.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.