T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:24- Finding
Emby API Credentials Exposed in Query Strings and Plaintext HTTP
- Content
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:" // 用户提供 const API_KEY = "" // 用户提供 // GET 请求 fetch(`${BASE}/endpoint?api_key=${API_KEY}`) // POST 请求 fetch(`${BASE}/endpoint?api_key=${API_KEY}`, { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: JSON.stringify({...}) }) ``` The API reference reinforces the insecure pattern: ```text GET http://:/System/Info?api_key= ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill mandates query-string authentication and documents plaintext HTTP as the standard connection format. Query parameters are commonly retained in reverse-proxy logs, application access logs, browser or client history, monitoring systems, exception messages, and diagnostic output. Consequently, an Emby API key can be disclosed even if the response body is handled securely. When the server address uses HTTP, both the API key and returned data are transmitted without transport encryption. An attacker with visibility into the local network, an upstream gateway, or another network interception point could recover the key and sensitive Emby data. The network destination is the user-supplied Emby server and is necessary for the declared management functionality. There is no evidence of transmission to an unrelated or attacker-controlled service. The vulnerability is insecure credential transport rather than confirmed intentional exfiltration. ### Attack Path 1. A user supplies an Emby server URL and an API key. 2. The Skill constructs a URL containing `api_key=`. 3. The full URL is transmitted over HTTP or recorded by a client, proxy, se ...[truncated 992 chars]- Remediation
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