T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
SKILL.md:13- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation and Immediate Execution
- Content
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`) ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented installation commands retrieve `openpond-code` without specifying a reviewed version, integrity hash, lockfile, or package provenance requirement. Consequently, the package version resolved at execution time is mutable. The `npx` alternative is especially sensitive because it may download and immediately execute package code. npm package installation can also execute lifecycle scripts. If the package publisher, registry account, release process, or transitive dependency chain is compromised, a subsequently published malicious version could execute even though the skill documentation itself has not changed. No evidence establishes that the current package is malicious. The vulnerability is the unsafe dependency-consumption pattern and the absence of controls that would constrain package selection to an audited artifact. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package release pipeline, registry resolution path, or a transitive dependency used by `openpond-code`. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious package version or causes dependency resolution to select attacker-controlled code. 3. A user follows the documented `npm i -g openpond-code` or `npx --package openpond-code ...` instruction. 4. npm retrieves the mutable package version and executes installation lifecycle code or the requested CLI entry point. 5. The malicious code runs with the privileges of the user invoking npm or npx. 6. It may access files, source repositories, environment variables, CLI credentials, and network resources available to that user. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execu ...[truncated 454 chars]- Remediation
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openpond ``` 2. Prefer a project-local dependency recorded in a lockfile over a global installation. 3. Document the authoritative package registry, package publisher, and repository so users can verify provenance. 4. Use npm provenance attestations and integrity verification where available. 5. Review package lifecycle scripts and the complete transitive dependency tree before recommending a release. 6. Introduce an explicit update process in which new versions are reviewed before the documented version pin is changed. 7. In higher-assurance environments, install from an organization-controlled registry mirror containing only approved package versions. ]]>