TinkerClaw OwnTracks Location

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 11, 2026 · 5:12 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.2

Overview

This skill is a clearly disclosed self-hosted OwnTracks location receiver with sensitive but purpose-aligned local storage and token handling.

Install only if you are comfortable letting this skill store your recent location history locally. Keep the default loopback/private-network setup, avoid exposing plain HTTP to the public internet, prefer OS keychain token storage, and use purge/revoke when you no longer want the receiver active.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (32)

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

const STORE_SSID = process.env.OWNTRACKS_STORE_SSID === "1";
const LOG_COORDS = process.env.OWNTRACKS_LOG_COORDS === "1";

const KEYCHAIN_SERVICE = "owntracks-location";
const KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT = "receiver-token";

const historyFile = join(DATA_DIR, "history.json");

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

const STORE_SSID = process.env.OWNTRACKS_STORE_SSID === "1";
const LOG_COORDS = process.env.OWNTRACKS_LOG_COORDS === "1";

const KEYCHAIN_SERVICE = "owntracks-location";
const KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT = "receiver-token";

const historyFile = join(DATA_DIR, "history.json");

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

const STORE_SSID = process.env.OWNTRACKS_STORE_SSID === "1";
const LOG_COORDS = process.env.OWNTRACKS_LOG_COORDS === "1";

const KEYCHAIN_SERVICE = "owntracks-location";
const KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT = "receiver-token";

const historyFile = join(DATA_DIR, "history.json");

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

const STORE_SSID = process.env.OWNTRACKS_STORE_SSID === "1";
const LOG_COORDS = process.env.OWNTRACKS_LOG_COORDS === "1";

const KEYCHAIN_SERVICE = "owntracks-location";
const KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT = "receiver-token";

const historyFile = join(DATA_DIR, "history.json");

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

const STORE_SSID = process.env.OWNTRACKS_STORE_SSID === "1";
const LOG_COORDS = process.env.OWNTRACKS_LOG_COORDS === "1";

const KEYCHAIN_SERVICE = "owntracks-location";
const KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT = "receiver-token";

const historyFile = join(DATA_DIR, "history.json");

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

const STORE_SSID = process.env.OWNTRACKS_STORE_SSID === "1";
const LOG_COORDS = process.env.OWNTRACKS_LOG_COORDS === "1";

const KEYCHAIN_SERVICE = "owntracks-location";
const KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT = "receiver-token";

const historyFile = join(DATA_DIR, "history.json");

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

const STORE_SSID = process.env.OWNTRACKS_STORE_SSID === "1";
const LOG_COORDS = process.env.OWNTRACKS_LOG_COORDS === "1";

const KEYCHAIN_SERVICE = "owntracks-location";
const KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT = "receiver-token";

const historyFile = join(DATA_DIR, "history.json");

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

const STORE_SSID = process.env.OWNTRACKS_STORE_SSID === "1";
const LOG_COORDS = process.env.OWNTRACKS_LOG_COORDS === "1";

const KEYCHAIN_SERVICE = "owntracks-location";
const KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT = "receiver-token";

const historyFile = join(DATA_DIR, "history.json");

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

console.log("🔐 Token stored in the OS keychain.");
  } else {
    writePrivate(tokenFile, token + "\n");
    console.log(`⚠️  WARNING: no OS keychain available (install libsecret's secret-tool on Linux).`);
    console.log(`⚠️  The token was written to ${tokenFile} as a plain 0600 file instead.`);
    console.log(`⚠️  Anyone who can read that file, or run as this user, can read your location.`);
  }

• Confidence: 86% confidence
• Finding: When no OS keychain is available, the token is written to a plaintext file and later used to protect access to sensitive location history. Although permissions are tightened to 0600, compromise of the same user account, backup leakage, or weak filesystem isolation would expose the bearer token and allow an attacker to read or submit location data.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

}

if (flags.has("--revoke") || flags.has("--logout")) {
  const inKeychain = keychainClear();
  const hadFile = existsSync(tokenFile);
  if (hadFile) rmSync(tokenFile, { force: true });
  console.log(`🔓 Keychain entry: ${inKeychain ? "cleared" : "none found"}`);

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

}

if (flags.has("--revoke") || flags.has("--logout")) {
  const inKeychain = keychainClear();
  const hadFile = existsSync(tokenFile);
  if (hadFile) rmSync(tokenFile, { force: true });
  console.log(`🔓 Keychain entry: ${inKeychain ? "cleared" : "none found"}`);

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Focused tests for the OwnTracks receiver: loopback default, auth on every data
# endpoint, retention/cap, and the purge off-switch. Uses a throwaway data dir and
# an env-supplied token, so no keychain entry and no real trail are touched.
set -uo pipefail
SRC="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
SERVER="$SRC/scripts/server.mjs"

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Focused tests for the OwnTracks receiver: loopback default, auth on every data
# endpoint, retention/cap, and the purge off-switch. Uses a throwaway data dir and
# an env-supplied token, so no keychain entry and no real trail are touched.
set -uo pipefail
SRC="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
SERVER="$SRC/scripts/server.mjs"

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Focused tests for the OwnTracks receiver: loopback default, auth on every data
# endpoint, retention/cap, and the purge off-switch. Uses a throwaway data dir and
# an env-supplied token, so no keychain entry and no real trail are touched.
set -uo pipefail
SRC="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
SERVER="$SRC/scripts/server.mjs"

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Focused tests for the OwnTracks receiver: loopback default, auth on every data
# endpoint, retention/cap, and the purge off-switch. Uses a throwaway data dir and
# an env-supplied token, so no keychain entry and no real trail are touched.
set -uo pipefail
SRC="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
SERVER="$SRC/scripts/server.mjs"

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Focused tests for the OwnTracks receiver: loopback default, auth on every data
# endpoint, retention/cap, and the purge off-switch. Uses a throwaway data dir and
# an env-supplied token, so no keychain entry and no real trail are touched.
set -uo pipefail
SRC="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
SERVER="$SRC/scripts/server.mjs"

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Focused tests for the OwnTracks receiver: loopback default, auth on every data
# endpoint, retention/cap, and the purge off-switch. Uses a throwaway data dir and
# an env-supplied token, so no keychain entry and no real trail are touched.
set -uo pipefail
SRC="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
SERVER="$SRC/scripts/server.mjs"

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Focused tests for the OwnTracks receiver: loopback default, auth on every data
# endpoint, retention/cap, and the purge off-switch. Uses a throwaway data dir and
# an env-supplied token, so no keychain entry and no real trail are touched.
set -uo pipefail
SRC="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
SERVER="$SRC/scripts/server.mjs"

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Focused tests for the OwnTracks receiver: loopback default, auth on every data
# endpoint, retention/cap, and the purge off-switch. Uses a throwaway data dir and
# an env-supplied token, so no keychain entry and no real trail are touched.
set -uo pipefail
SRC="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
SERVER="$SRC/scripts/server.mjs"

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Focused tests for the OwnTracks receiver: loopback default, auth on every data
# endpoint, retention/cap, and the purge off-switch. Uses a throwaway data dir and
# an env-supplied token, so no keychain entry and no real trail are touched.
set -uo pipefail
SRC="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
SERVER="$SRC/scripts/server.mjs"

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Focused tests for the OwnTracks receiver: loopback default, auth on every data
# endpoint, retention/cap, and the purge off-switch. Uses a throwaway data dir and
# an env-supplied token, so no keychain entry and no real trail are touched.
set -uo pipefail
SRC="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
SERVER="$SRC/scripts/server.mjs"

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Focused tests for the OwnTracks receiver: loopback default, auth on every data
# endpoint, retention/cap, and the purge off-switch. Uses a throwaway data dir and
# an env-supplied token, so no keychain entry and no real trail are touched.
set -uo pipefail
SRC="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
SERVER="$SRC/scripts/server.mjs"

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Focused tests for the OwnTracks receiver: loopback default, auth on every data
# endpoint, retention/cap, and the purge off-switch. Uses a throwaway data dir and
# an env-supplied token, so no keychain entry and no real trail are touched.
set -uo pipefail
SRC="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
SERVER="$SRC/scripts/server.mjs"

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Focused tests for the OwnTracks receiver: loopback default, auth on every data
# endpoint, retention/cap, and the purge off-switch. Uses a throwaway data dir and
# an env-supplied token, so no keychain entry and no real trail are touched.
set -uo pipefail
SRC="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
SERVER="$SRC/scripts/server.mjs"

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Focused tests for the OwnTracks receiver: loopback default, auth on every data
# endpoint, retention/cap, and the purge off-switch. Uses a throwaway data dir and
# an env-supplied token, so no keychain entry and no real trail are touched.
set -uo pipefail
SRC="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
SERVER="$SRC/scripts/server.mjs"

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.