Security audit

TinkerClaw OwnTracks Location

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill does what it claims, but it exposes precise live and historical phone location data over unauthenticated local-network HTTP endpoints by default.

Install only on a trusted machine and network. Before using it with real phone location data, bind it to localhost or a private tunnel, protect all read and write endpoints with authentication, avoid plain HTTP on untrusted networks, restrict file permissions on the data directory, and set a retention/deletion policy for location history.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 94% confidence
Finding: The skill handles continuous, highly sensitive geolocation data and exposes both current location and history over local HTTP endpoints, but the documentation does not clearly warn users about the privacy and security implications. This can lead users to deploy the service without understanding that precise movement data is being retained and made queryable, increasing the risk of stalking, surveillance, or unauthorized disclosure if the host or local network is accessed.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 97% confidence
Finding: The setup instructs users to send live phone location updates to a plain HTTP endpoint, which provides no transport encryption or peer authentication. On any network path that is not fully trusted, location data and any identifiers in the payload can be intercepted or modified by attackers, exposing real-time whereabouts and enabling spoofed updates.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 84% confidence
Finding: The `where` command reads precise location data from `latest.json` and prints it directly to stdout, including coordinates, accuracy, age, and battery status, without any confirmation, masking, or explicit privacy warning. In a location-tracking skill, this behavior is expected functionally, but it still creates a real privacy exposure because any caller with access to invoke the CLI can retrieve sensitive real-time location information.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 84% confidence
Finding: The server persistently stores precise phone location history and related metadata such as SSID and battery level in local JSON files without any access-control hardening, retention controls beyond a fixed cap, or operator-facing disclosure. In the context of a location-tracking skill, this is sensitive personal data, so insecure-at-rest handling increases the impact of host compromise, backup leakage, or accidental file sharing.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 99% confidence
Finding: The /latest and /history endpoints return sensitive location data over HTTP with no authentication or authorization at all, even though POST ingestion may optionally require a bearer token. Because the server listens on 0.0.0.0, anyone with network access to the service can retrieve current and historical location data, which is especially dangerous given this skill's purpose is real-time phone tracking.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.