T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:66
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 66-68 **Vulnerability Type**: Supply-chain risk from an unpinned third-party dependency **Risk Level**: Medium **Vulnerable Code:** ```bash pip install mcp-nano-banana ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented installation command retrieves and installs the latest available release of `mcp-nano-banana` without an exact version constraint, cryptographic hash verification, lockfile, or other integrity control. Consequently, the installed artifact can change after the Skill has been reviewed. Python package installation may execute build-system hooks when a source distribution is used. Installed packages can also execute arbitrary code when imported or invoked. A compromised package repository account, malicious future release, or upstream supply-chain compromise could therefore introduce attacker-controlled code into systems whose users follow this instruction. No evidence establishes that the current package is malicious; the vulnerability is the absence of controls that ensure users receive a specifically reviewed artifact. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package publisher account, distribution process, or another relevant upstream component. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release of `mcp-nano-banana`. 3. A user follows the documented `pip install mcp-nano-banana` instruction. 4. `pip` resolves the uncontrolled current release rather than a known, reviewed version. 5. Attacker-controlled code executes during a source build or when the installed MCP package is subsequently imported or launched. 6. The code operates with the privileges and environment access of the installing or executing user. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user installing or running the package. The affected scope may include files accessible to that user, active environment variables, net ...[truncated 305 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions - Pin the dependency to an exact, security-reviewed version, for example: ```bash pip install "mcp-nano-banana==<reviewed-version>" ``` - Verify distribution integrity with approved SHA-256 hashes and install using a hash-enforced requirements file: ```bash pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` - Commit a lockfile or equivalent reproducible dependency manifest that also constrains transitive dependencies. - Document the verified package publisher and official repository so users can validate provenance. - Prefer signed artifacts or package attestations where the package ecosystem and publisher support them. - Install and run the MCP server in an isolated virtual environment or container with minimal filesystem, credential, and network access. - Review new versions before updating the pinned version, rather than automatically consuming the latest release.