T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:71- Finding
API Credential Can Be Transmitted to an Unrestricted Configurable Destination
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This Scoro skill appears purpose-built, but it gives an agent broad company data and mutation access through an API key sent to a configurable URL.
Install only with a dedicated least-privilege Scoro API key, verify SCORO_COMPANY_URL is exactly your HTTPS Scoro tenant API URL, and avoid enabling finance/contact/delete-capable permissions unless you intentionally want the agent to access or change those records. Treat team reports as sensitive employee data and require clear user authorization before using them.
SKILL.md:71API Credential Can Be Transmitted to an Unrestricted Configurable Destination
The activation text says to use the skill for 'any Scoro data,' which is overly broad and can cause the agent to invoke this integration for loosely related prompts. In practice, that increases the risk of unnecessary access to sensitive business records and of the model choosing this skill when a safer or narrower path would be more appropriate.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
---
name: scoro
description: "Scoro API v2 integration for time tracking, task management, utilization reporting, team status reports, and billable corrections. Use when: user asks about Scoro tasks, time entries, hours (billable/non-billable), utilization reports, team status, or any Scoro data."
homepage: https://api.scoro.com/api/v2
metadata:
{
"openclaw":
The standard prompts use broad natural-language triggers like 'show team status' and 'team pulse' without clear guardrails on whose data may be accessed or what authorization is required. This can lead to over-collection of employee time, utilization, and manager-reporting data, especially in environments where prompts are ambiguous or the requesting user should not have broad visibility.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -X POST "$SCORO_COMPANY_URL/timeEntries/list" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"apiKey": "'"$SCORO_API_KEY"'",
The skill documentation expands scope from time tracking and reporting into many unrelated Scoro modules and explicitly mentions destructive operations like delete. That broadens the available action surface far beyond the declared purpose, increasing the chance an agent will perform sensitive or destructive actions against finance, contacts, orders, or other business data when a user only expected reporting/task support.
No suspicious patterns detected.