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Security audit

Voice Agent Pro

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This voice-cloning and calling skill is mostly disclosed, but it asks for broad credentials and persistent access beyond the implemented code and stores sensitive API keys in plaintext.

Review before installing. Use only with explicit consent from the voice owner, understand that voice samples are uploaded to ElevenLabs, avoid granting Telegram/Twilio credentials unless you are enabling calls or notifications, and prefer scoped secrets or a protected secret store over plaintext config.json or broad .env access.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (4)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:76
Finding
Unpinned dependencies installed into the system Python environment<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:76-85`; duplicated in `setup_guide.md:8-16` and `setup_guide.md:71-76` **Vulnerability Type**: Unsafe dependency installation and excessive installation privileges **Risk Level**: High ### Complete Code Snippet ```bash # Inside the container (agent runs this directly) pip install elevenlabs --break-system-packages pip install twilio --break-system-packages apt-get update && apt-get install -y ffmpeg # Verify ffmpeg -version | head -1 python3 -c "from elevenlabs.client import ElevenLabs; print('✅ SDK ready')" ``` The host-oriented setup guide additionally instructs users to connect as root and run equivalent commands inside the container: ```bash # From your VPS host via SSH ssh root@your-vps-ip # Execute a command inside the container docker exec openclaw-yyvg-openclaw-1 pip install elevenlabs --break-system-packages docker exec openclaw-yyvg-openclaw-1 pip install twilio --break-system-packages docker exec openclaw-yyvg-openclaw-1 apt-get update docker exec openclaw-yyvg-openclaw-1 apt-get install -y ffmpeg ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill installs the latest available versions of `elevenlabs` and `twilio` without exact version constraints, integrity hashes, or a lock file. The `--break-system-packages` option deliberately bypasses the operating system’s externally managed Python protection and modifies the container-wide Python environment. Installing packages from a public package repository necessarily executes package installation logic and subsequently imports package code. Without pinned versions and hashes, the effective code installed during setup can differ from the version reviewed with the Skill. A compromised upstream release, maintainer account, package repository, or dependency in the transitive dependency tree could introduce arbitrary code into the container. System-level installation also exceeds the minimum privilege needed for a Python CLI. A dedicated virtual envir ...[truncated 1271 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin every direct dependency to an audited exact version, for example through a version-controlled lock file. 2. Require package hashes with `pip install --require-hashes`. 3. Lock and audit transitive dependencies, not only `elevenlabs` and `twilio`. 4. Install packages in a dedicated virtual environment rather than using `--break-system-packages`. 5. Prefer a reproducible container image that installs dependencies during a controlled build. 6. Run installation and application execution as a non-root user wherever possible. 7. Separate optional Twilio dependencies from the TTS-only installation path. 8. Add automated dependency vulnerability and provenance scanning to the release process. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
voice_generator.py:36
Finding
ElevenLabs API credentials are persisted in a plaintext workspace file<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `voice_generator.py:36-40` and `voice_generator.py:294-316`; corresponding secret fields in `config.json:4-9` **Vulnerability Type**: Plaintext sensitive credential storage without explicit access controls **Risk Level**: High ### Complete Code Snippet ```python def save_config(data): os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(CONFIG_FILE), exist_ok=True) with open(CONFIG_FILE, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f: json.dump(data, f, indent=2) ``` ```python def cmd_apply_config(args): """Write credentials to config.json — no container restart needed.""" cfg = load_config() if args.api_key: cfg["ELEVENLABS_API_KEY"] = args.api_key print(f" ✅ ELEVENLABS_API_KEY set") if args.voice_id: cfg["ELEVENLABS_VOICE_ID"] = args.voice_id print(f" ✅ ELEVENLABS_VOICE_ID set: {args.voice_id[:8]}...") if args.agent_id: cfg["ELEVENLABS_AGENT_ID"] = args.agent_id print(f" ✅ ELEVENLABS_AGENT_ID set") if not args.setup_date: from datetime import date cfg["setup_date"] = date.today().isoformat() save_config(cfg) log_audit(f"Config updated via apply-config — {list(cfg.keys())}") ``` The configuration schema explicitly contains sensitive fields: ```json { "ELEVENLABS_API_KEY": null, "ELEVENLABS_VOICE_ID": null, "ELEVENLABS_AGENT_ID": null, "TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID": "", "TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN": "", "TWILIO_PHONE_NUMBER": "" } ``` ### Technical Analysis The `apply-config` command places the ElevenLabs API key directly into `/workspace/voice/config.json`. The file is opened using the process umask and no restrictive mode such as `0600` is enforced. No ownership validation, secret encryption, atomic secure creation, or protection against an existing permissive file is implemented. The workspace is also used for scripts, generated files, calls, and cross-Skill data. Persisting an API key in this shared filesystem increases the numb ...[truncated 1549 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Do not persist API keys in `config.json`; retain only non-secret identifiers such as voice and agent IDs there. 2. Retrieve secrets from a dedicated secret manager, container secret mount, or protected environment injection mechanism. 3. Avoid accepting secrets as command-line arguments. Read them from a protected file descriptor, secret mount, or interactive non-echoing prompt. 4. If local storage is unavoidable, create the secret file atomically with mode `0600`, validate its owner, and reject symlinks or unexpectedly permissive existing files. 5. Separate public configuration from secret configuration. 6. Restrict ElevenLabs keys to the minimum service scopes and usage limits required by the Skill. 7. Rotate any credential that may already have been written to a shared or insufficiently protected workspace. 8. Ensure backups, logs, support bundles, and version-control rules exclude secret-bearing configuration files. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
voice_generator.py:141
Finding
Predictable shared temporary files permit symlink attacks and cross-run corruption<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `voice_generator.py:141-166` **Vulnerability Type**: Insecure temporary-file creation **Risk Level**: Medium ### Complete Code Snippet ```python tmp_files = [] for i, chunk in enumerate(chunks): tmp_path = f"/tmp/voice_chunk_{i:03d}.mp3" print(f" Chunk {i+1}/{len(chunks)}: {len(chunk)} chars") audio_bytes = tts_chunk(api_key, voice_id, chunk, model) with open(tmp_path, "wb") as f: f.write(audio_bytes) tmp_files.append(tmp_path) if len(tmp_files) == 1: import shutil shutil.copy(tmp_files[0], output_path) else: # Concatenate with ffmpeg list_file = "/tmp/voice_concat_list.txt" with open(list_file, "w") as f: for p in tmp_files: f.write(f"file '{p}'\n") result = subprocess.run( ["ffmpeg", "-y", "-f", "concat", "-safe", "0", "-i", list_file, "-c", "copy", output_path], capture_output=True, text=True ) ``` ### Technical Analysis The implementation uses deterministic names such as `/tmp/voice_chunk_000.mp3` and `/tmp/voice_concat_list.txt`. These files are opened with ordinary `open(..., "w" or "wb")`, which follows symbolic links and truncates existing targets. Shared temporary directories are normally writable by multiple users or processes. An attacker who can create entries in `/tmp` can predict these names before the Skill runs. Concurrent legitimate executions also use the same names and can overwrite, delete, or concatenate each other’s files. The temporary MP3 files are removed after generation, but the concatenation list is not removed. Cleanup is not protected by a `finally` block, so exceptions may also leave generated audio behind. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker with access to the same shared temporary directory predicts `/tmp/voice_chunk_000.mp3` or `/tmp/voice_concat_list.txt`. 2. The attacker creates that path as a symbolic link to a file writable by the Skill process, or places content that ...[truncated 868 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Create a unique private directory for each execution with `tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()`. 2. Store all chunks and the ffmpeg list inside that directory. 3. Use securely created temporary files rather than deterministic names. 4. Ensure the temporary directory is accessible only to the current process owner. 5. Perform cleanup through a context manager or `finally` block. 6. Do not follow symlinks when opening security-sensitive files. 7. Remove the ffmpeg concatenation list as part of cleanup. 8. Add concurrency tests to confirm that simultaneous TTS jobs cannot access or overwrite one another’s intermediate files. ]]>

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:20
Finding
Skill metadata requests secrets and persistent workspace access beyond implemented functionality<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:20-46` **Vulnerability Type**: Excessive secret and filesystem permissions **Risk Level**: Medium ### Complete Code Snippet ```yaml metadata: openclaw: emoji: "🎙️" security_level: L2 required_paths: read: - /workspace/voice/config.json - /workspace/voice/scripts/ - /workspace/voice/samples/ - /workspace/voice/references/setup_guide.md - /workspace/.learnings/LEARNINGS.md write: - /workspace/voice/config.json - /workspace/voice/output/ - /workspace/voice/calls/ - /workspace/.learnings/ - /workspace/AUDIT.md network_behavior: makes_requests: true request_targets: - https://api.elevenlabs.io (ElevenLabs REST API — requires ELEVENLABS_API_KEY) - https://api.twilio.com (Twilio REST API — optional, requires TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID) - https://api.telegram.org (Telegram Bot API — requires TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN) uses_agent_telegram: true requires.env: - TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN - TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID - ELEVENLABS_API_KEY - ELEVENLABS_VOICE_ID - TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID - TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN - TWILIO_PHONE_NUMBER ``` ### Technical Analysis The implemented Python executable sends TTS requests to ElevenLabs and reads local call JSON files for listing and summaries. It contains no Twilio API call and no Telegram API call. Nevertheless, the Skill metadata requests Telegram and Twilio credentials as required environment variables and declares those external network targets. The metadata also requests read access to persistent learning state and write access to the entire `/workspace/.learnings/` directory. The implementation only writes the specific file `/workspace/.learnings/ERRORS.md` and does not need to read `LEARNINGS.md`. Broad directory access exposes unrelated persistent state belonging to other Skills or future sessions. These p ...[truncated 1458 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Make the minimal TTS profile require only `ELEVENLABS_API_KEY` and `ELEVENLABS_VOICE_ID`. 2. Do not request Telegram credentials unless a Telegram notification feature is implemented and explicitly enabled. 3. Do not request Twilio credentials unless an actual calling operation is invoked. 4. Separate optional calling and notification features into distinct capability profiles or sub-Skills. 5. Remove read access to `/workspace/.learnings/LEARNINGS.md` unless code requiring it is added and reviewed. 6. Replace write access to the entire learning directory with access only to `/workspace/.learnings/ERRORS.md`. 7. Grant access to call records only for the specific `calls` operation rather than for all TTS execution. 8. Use narrowly scoped service credentials, server-side API restrictions, and explicit user consent before enabling outbound calls or notifications. ]]>

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
Findings (59)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 325, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Content
"https://api.elevenlabs.io/v1/user",
                headers={"xi-api-key": key}
            )
            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as resp:
                import json
                data = json.loads(resp.read())
                plan = data.get("subscription", {}).get("tier", "unknown")
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The document promises voice cloning and calling features, but much of the behavior is only described procedurally and includes credential-writing and API verification flows not cleanly reflected in the declared purpose. This mismatch makes review difficult and can conceal risky actions such as modifying local config with secrets and contacting third-party services under the guise of a content-generation skill.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
```
LAYER 1 — VOICE SETUP
  Clones the principal's voice from MP3 samples via ElevenLabs API
  Requires ELEVENLABS_API_KEY and ELEVENLABS_VOICE_ID in .env
  Full setup guide with all commands: references/setup_guide.md

LAYER 2 — TEXT TO SPEECH
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly directs use of secrets from .env for ElevenLabs credentials, showing it expects credential access during execution. Access to environment-stored secrets is sensitive because the same agent context may hold unrelated tokens, and voice/Twilio workflows can chain that access into external transmission.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
OPTION B — Manual (recommended for first setup)
  → Go to: https://elevenlabs.io/app/settings/api-keys
  → Click "Create API Key" → name it → copy it
  → Add to your agent .env file: ELEVENLABS_API_KEY=sk_...
```

```bash
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
This section instructs operators to place the ElevenLabs API key in the agent .env, making the secret broadly available to any process with environment access. In combination with shell and network capabilities, that increases the chance of credential leakage or misuse.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
print("✅ Voice ID saved to config.json")
```

#### Via curl

```bash
VOICE_ID=$(curl -s -X POST https://api.elevenlabs.io/v1/voices/add \
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
### Setup Twilio

```bash
# Add to your agent .env file:
TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID=ACxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN=your_auth_token
TWILIO_PHONE_NUMBER=+1234567890
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
Twilio account SID, auth token, and phone number are placed in the shared .env, exposing high-value telephony credentials to the agent context. If misused, these credentials could enable unauthorized calls, message sending, billing abuse, or access to call records.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
→ Multiple speakers in same file
  Solution:
  → Delete the bad clone:
    curl -X DELETE https://api.elevenlabs.io/v1/voices/$VOICE_ID \
      -H "xi-api-key: $ELEVENLABS_API_KEY"
  → Record better samples (quieter, longer, more natural)
  → Re-run cloning
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
PROBLEM: "Invalid API key" (401 on all requests)
  Solution: Regenerate at https://elevenlabs.io/app/settings/api-keys
  Update .env and restart agent container

PROBLEM: ffmpeg not found
  Solution: apt-get update && apt-get install -y ffmpeg
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The troubleshooting step again relies on .env-managed API secrets and normalizes environment-wide credential storage for operational recovery. Repeated instructions to manipulate or depend on .env increase the likelihood of accidental disclosure, overbroad access, and secret sprawl.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
GET    /v1/user                 → account + subscription info
GET    /v1/voices               → list all voices
POST   /v1/voices/add           → create IVC clone (multipart form)
DELETE /v1/voices/{id}          → delete a voice
POST   /v1/text-to-speech/{id}  → generate audio (JSON body)
GET    /v1/models               → list available models
```
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
By documenting a raw DELETE /v1/voices/{id} capability, the skill exposes a destructive parameterized action that could remove arbitrary voice assets if the ID is mishandled or maliciously substituted. In a system centered on cloned-voice assets, insufficient validation or confirmation around such operations can cause data loss or service disruption.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
TWILIO_PHONE_NUMBER   → buy a number on Twilio (~$1/month)

AGENT ALREADY HAS:
  TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN    → already in your agent .env
  TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID      → already in your agent .env
```
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill notes that Telegram bot credentials already exist in the agent .env, implying access to messaging secrets that may be unrelated to voice generation. This broadens blast radius: compromise or misuse of the skill could pivot into unauthorized Telegram notifications or data exfiltration.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
AGENT ALREADY HAS:
  TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN    → already in your agent .env
  TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID      → already in your agent .env
```

### Voice Sample Requirements
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
Referencing TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID in the shared environment reinforces that the skill expects access to messaging destination metadata in addition to bot tokens. Coupled with transcript and lead handling, this can enable silent forwarding of sensitive summaries outside the local workspace.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
[ ] pip install twilio --break-system-packages (if using calls)
[ ] apt-get update && apt-get install -y ffmpeg
[ ] 3 MP3 samples uploaded to /workspace/voice/samples/
[ ] ELEVENLABS_API_KEY added to agent .env
[ ] ELEVENLABS_VOICE_ID added to agent .env (after cloning)
[ ] python3 voice_generator.py apply-config --api-key ... --voice-id ...
[ ] voice_generator.py status shows ✅ API Key and Voice ID
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The checklist directs storing ELEVENLABS_API_KEY in the agent .env as a standard setup step. Codifying this pattern increases organizational dependence on shared environment secrets and expands exposure if any skill can read env variables.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
[ ] apt-get update && apt-get install -y ffmpeg
[ ] 3 MP3 samples uploaded to /workspace/voice/samples/
[ ] ELEVENLABS_API_KEY added to agent .env
[ ] ELEVENLABS_VOICE_ID added to agent .env (after cloning)
[ ] python3 voice_generator.py apply-config --api-key ... --voice-id ...
[ ] voice_generator.py status shows ✅ API Key and Voice ID
[ ] Test TTS successful (output MP3 plays correctly)
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The checklist also places the voice ID and subsequent apply-config flow in an agent-visible setup pattern, tying sensitive identifiers and credentials into writable local config. This increases risk of credential/config tampering or unauthorized reuse of the cloned voice configuration.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
```
ERROR: ELEVENLABS_API_KEY invalid or missing
  Action: Verify at https://elevenlabs.io/app/settings/api-keys
  Log: ERRORS.md → "API key invalid [date] — check agent .env"

ERROR: Voice samples missing
  Action: Do NOT attempt voice cloning
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding
The error-handling section instructs operators to check agent .env when API keys fail, further entrenching shared-environment secret handling. This operational model raises the chance that secrets will be inspected, copied, or logged during debugging.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
# Then run pip install, apt-get etc. as normal
```

### Restart OpenClaw after .env changes

```bash
cd /docker/openclaw-yyvg
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
# Then run pip install, apt-get etc. as normal
```

### Restart OpenClaw after .env changes

```bash
cd /docker/openclaw-yyvg
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
# Then run pip install, apt-get etc. as normal
```

### Restart OpenClaw after .env changes

```bash
cd /docker/openclaw-yyvg
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
# Then run pip install, apt-get etc. as normal
```

### Restart OpenClaw after .env changes

```bash
cd /docker/openclaw-yyvg
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
# Then run pip install, apt-get etc. as normal
```

### Restart OpenClaw after .env changes

```bash
cd /docker/openclaw-yyvg
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
```bash
# Go to: https://elevenlabs.io/app/settings/api-keys
# Create API Key → copy → add to .env:
echo "ELEVENLABS_API_KEY=sk_your_key_here" >> /docker/openclaw-yyvg/.env

# Verify
curl -s https://api.elevenlabs.io/v1/user \
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The guide explicitly tells users to write an ElevenLabs API key into a .env file using shell redirection, with no warning about secret exposure, file protection, backups, shell recording, or source-control leakage. Because the key enables access to a third-party account and voice resources, compromise could allow unauthorized cloning, usage charges, or data access.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
echo "ELEVENLABS_API_KEY=sk_your_key_here" >> /docker/openclaw-yyvg/.env

# Verify
curl -s https://api.elevenlabs.io/v1/user \
  -H "xi-api-key: $ELEVENLABS_API_KEY" | python3 -m json.tool
```
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
echo "ELEVENLABS_API_KEY=sk_your_key_here" >> /docker/openclaw-yyvg/.env

# Verify
curl -s https://api.elevenlabs.io/v1/user \
  -H "xi-api-key: $ELEVENLABS_API_KEY" | python3 -m json.tool
```
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Missing User Warnings

High
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The instructions direct users to upload local voice samples to ElevenLabs for cloning without clearly warning that personal biometric voice data is being transmitted to and processed by a third party. Because voice prints are sensitive personal data and the skill is specifically cloning a principal's identity, omission of consent, privacy, and retention warnings materially raises privacy and impersonation risk.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
json.dump(config, f, indent=2)
```

### Step 3 — Clone via curl (alternative)

```bash
# Clone
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
| python3 -m json.tool

# Extract and save Voice ID
VOICE_ID=$(curl -s -X POST https://api.elevenlabs.io/v1/voices/add \
  -H "xi-api-key: $ELEVENLABS_API_KEY" \
  -F "name=[AGENT_VOICE_NAME]" \
  -F "files=@/workspace/voice/samples/sample_01.mp3" \
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.