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Security audit

Crypto Executor

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is an openly disclosed crypto trading bot, but it can autonomously trade real funds and combines live credentials, persistence, external code execution, and weak safety boundaries.

Review this carefully before installing. Use paper trading or testnet first, pin exact commits and package versions, run in an isolated virtual environment, avoid sourcing secrets into a general shell, disable withdrawals, IP-allowlist Binance keys, and do not enable systemd or cron persistence until you have audited the executor and oracle code and accepted autonomous live trading risk.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • System PersistenceInstalls backdoors, hooks, services, or scheduled tasks that survive the run
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (4)

T06 · System Persistence

Error
Location
SYSTEMD_SETUP.md:45
Finding
Persistent Autonomous Trading Service and Scheduled Restart<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SYSTEMD_SETUP.md:45-87`, `SYSTEMD_SETUP.md:108-117`, `SYSTEMD_SETUP.md:523-542` **Vulnerability Type**: Boot-time service registration, automatic process recovery, and privileged scheduled execution **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```ini [Unit] Description=Crypto Executor v2.3 PRODUCTION READY - Autonomous Trading Bot Documentation=https://github.com/georges91560/crypto-executor After=network-online.target Wants=network-online.target [Service] Type=simple User=your_username Group=your_username WorkingDirectory=/workspace/skills/crypto-executor EnvironmentFile=/etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /workspace/skills/crypto-executor/executor.py Restart=on-failure RestartSec=10 StartLimitInterval=200 StartLimitBurst=5 NoNewPrivileges=true PrivateTmp=true StandardOutput=journal StandardError=journal SyslogIdentifier=crypto-executor MemoryMax=2G CPUQuota=200% [Install] WantedBy=multi-user.target ``` ```bash sudo systemctl daemon-reload sudo systemctl enable crypto-executor ``` ```bash sudo cp /etc/systemd/system/crypto-executor.service \ /etc/systemd/system/crypto-executor-conservative.service sudo systemctl daemon-reload sudo systemctl enable crypto-executor-conservative sudo systemctl start crypto-executor-conservative sudo crontab -e 0 2 * * 0 systemctl restart crypto-executor ``` ### Technical Analysis The instructions establish cross-session persistence through three mechanisms: 1. `WantedBy=multi-user.target` and `systemctl enable` start the trading program automatically after reboot. 2. `Restart=on-failure` repeatedly relaunches it after crashes. 3. A root crontab periodically restarts the service. Continuous execution is consistent with the declared 24/7 autonomous-trading purpose, and the persistence is disclosed rather than covert. Nevertheless, it substantially increases security impact because the persistent process receives Binance trading cr ...[truncated 1840 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Do not enable boot persistence automatically; require explicit, informed operator approval. 2. Remove the redundant root cron restart. Use systemd supervision alone. 3. Run the bot under a dedicated unprivileged account with no login shell and no membership in privileged groups. 4. Ensure only root can modify the executable, dependency, service unit, and credential file. 5. Pin and verify the exact executor and oracle versions before enabling the service. 6. Add stronger systemd restrictions, for example: ```ini NoNewPrivileges=true ProtectSystem=strict ProtectHome=true PrivateDevices=true ProtectKernelTunables=true ProtectKernelModules=true ProtectControlGroups=true RestrictSUIDSGID=true LockPersonality=true ReadWritePaths=/workspace/reports /workspace/config_history RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 ``` 7. Avoid multiple instances sharing the same credentials and state files. If multiple instances are required, give each separate API keys, limits, working directories, and state files. 8. Document complete removal procedures: ```bash sudo systemctl disable --now crypto-executor sudo systemctl disable --now crypto-executor-conservative sudo rm /etc/systemd/system/crypto-executor*.service sudo systemctl daemon-reload sudo crontab -e # remove the scheduled restart ``` 9. Configure Binance keys with withdrawals disabled, strict IP allowlisting, and the narrowest available trading permissions. ]]>

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
CONFIGURATION.md:225
Finding
Unpinned Remote Dependencies Are Downloaded and Executed with Credential-Bearing Environment<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `CONFIGURATION.md:225-244`, `CONFIGURATION.md:318-344`, `CONFIGURATION.md:362`; `SKILL.md:25-31`, `SKILL.md:104-109`; `executor.py:368-380` **Vulnerability Type**: Mutable remote payload retrieval and insecure dependency execution **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```bash git clone https://github.com/georges91560/crypto-sniper-oracle.git cd crypto-sniper-oracle cat crypto_oracle.py cp -r crypto-sniper-oracle/* /workspace/skills/crypto-sniper-oracle/ python3 /workspace/skills/crypto-sniper-oracle/crypto_oracle.py --symbol BTCUSDT ``` ```bash cd /workspace/skills git clone https://github.com/georges91560/Crypto_Executor.git crypto-executor-repo cp crypto-executor-repo/executor.py /workspace/skills/crypto-executor/executor.py chmod +x /workspace/skills/crypto-executor/executor.py python3 -c "import ast; ast.parse(open('/workspace/skills/crypto-executor/executor.py').read()); print('✅ executor.py syntax OK')" # Option B: Direct download (if git not available) # curl -o /workspace/skills/crypto-executor/executor.py \ # https://raw.githubusercontent.com/georges91560/Crypto_Executor/main/executor.py ``` ```bash pip install websocket-client --break-system-packages ``` The downloaded oracle is then executed by the main application: ```python def fetch(self, symbol): """Fetch data for single symbol.""" try: result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(self.oracle_script), "--symbol", symbol], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10 ) if result.returncode == 0: return json.loads(result.stdout) else: return None except Exception as e: print(f"[ERROR] Fetch {symbol}: {e}") return None ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation commands retrieve mutable repository HEAD content without enforcing a reviewed commit, tag, checksum, or signature. The alternative raw GitH ...[truncated 2691 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin each Git repository to a reviewed full commit hash: ```bash git clone https://github.com/georges91560/crypto-sniper-oracle.git cd crypto-sniper-oracle git checkout --detach VERIFIED_FULL_COMMIT_HASH test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "VERIFIED_FULL_COMMIT_HASH" ``` 2. Publish and verify cryptographic checksums for copied executables. 3. Vendor the reviewed oracle inside the audited release rather than dynamically obtaining mutable code. 4. Pin Python package versions and hashes in a requirements file: ```text websocket-client==REVIEWED_VERSION \ --hash=sha256:VERIFIED_PACKAGE_HASH ``` 5. Install packages in a dedicated virtual environment; do not use `--break-system-packages`. 6. Launch the oracle with an explicit minimal environment that excludes all secrets: ```python safe_env = { "PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", ""), "PYTHONPATH": "", "LANG": "C.UTF-8", } result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(self.oracle_script), "--symbol", symbol], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10, env=safe_env, cwd=str(self.oracle_script.parent), ) ``` 7. Restrict the oracle’s network access to only the necessary Binance public market-data endpoints, preferably using a separate sandbox or process-level network policy. 8. Make installed code root-owned and non-writable by the service account. 9. Require code review and integrity verification as enforced installation steps rather than optional comments. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
executor.py:961
Finding
OCO Failure Fallback Does Not Create a Stop-Loss Order<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `executor.py:961-978` **Vulnerability Type**: Incorrect fail-safe order semantics in real-money trade execution **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```python oco_order = self.binance.create_oco_order( symbol=symbol, side='SELL' if side == 'BUY' else 'BUY', quantity=quantity, price=take_profit, stop_price=stop_price, stop_limit_price=stop_limit ) # BUG6-FIX: OCO failed → place emergency market stop loss if not oco_order: print(f"[WARNING] OCO failed for {symbol} — placing emergency SL") self.binance.create_order( symbol=symbol, side='SELL' if side == 'BUY' else 'BUY', quantity=quantity, price=stop_price, order_type='LIMIT' ) ``` ### Technical Analysis The comment and log message claim that the fallback creates an “emergency market stop loss,” but the code submits a normal `LIMIT` order. A limit order has no stop trigger and is not equivalent to either a stop-loss limit or stop-loss market order. For a long position, a sell limit placed below the current market price may become immediately executable, prematurely closing the newly opened position. Depending on exchange rules and market state, it may instead be rejected or fail to provide the expected downside trigger. For a short-side workflow, the corresponding buy limit can have similarly incorrect behavior. The code also does not verify whether the fallback order succeeds. It records the position as open even when both the OCO order and fallback protection fail. This violates the stated guarantee that each trade has mandatory stop-loss protection. ### Attack Path 1. A market entry order succeeds and exposes real capital. 2. OCO creation fails because of invalid precision, price-filter constraints, insufficient balance, API behavior, or a transient network error. 3. The fallback sends an ordinary limit order at the intended stop price. 4. The order either fills immediate ...[truncated 1104 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Use a Binance-supported stop-trigger order type with the correct parameters for the account and API version, rather than a plain limit order. 2. Validate symbol filters for price tick size, quantity step size, minimum notional value, and supported order types before submission. 3. Confirm that the protective order has been accepted and is active on the exchange. 4. If OCO and emergency protection both fail, immediately flatten or cancel the exposed entry and halt new trading. 5. Do not save the position as protected until exchange confirmation is received. 6. Record distinct states such as `ENTRY_FILLED_UNPROTECTED`, `PROTECTION_PENDING`, and `PROTECTED`. 7. Add retry logic with bounded attempts and idempotent client order IDs. 8. Reconcile exchange orders and balances after every failed protection request. 9. Add integration tests covering OCO rejection, price-filter failure, timeout, partial fill, and emergency-close failure. 10. Change the log message so it accurately identifies the submitted order type and result. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
executor.py:1021
Finding
Trailing Stops Are Updated Only in Local State and Not on Binance<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `executor.py:1021-1035` **Vulnerability Type**: Local-only risk-control update that does not modify exchange orders **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```python def update_trailing_stops(self): """Update trailing stops for all positions.""" for position in self.portfolio.positions: current_price = self.binance.get_price(position['symbol']) if not current_price: continue position['current_price'] = current_price new_trailing = self.risk.calculate_trailing_stop(position) if new_trailing > position.get('trailing_stop', 0): position['trailing_stop'] = new_trailing print(f"[TRAIL] {position['symbol']} trailing stop → ${new_trailing:.2f}") self.portfolio.save_state() ``` ### Technical Analysis The function calculates a new trailing-stop value and writes it to local JSON state, but it does not cancel, replace, or amend any Binance order. No API call is made after `new_trailing` is calculated. Consequently, the exchange-side OCO order remains at its original stop price while the local application reports a higher trailing stop. If the process stops, loses connectivity, or the market reverses, Binance can enforce only the original order—not the locally recorded value. This is especially dangerous because the README and Skill description advertise trailing stops as automatically locking profits. The implementation creates a material discrepancy between documented protection, local state, and actual exchange state. ### Attack Path 1. A position is opened with an initial Binance OCO stop. 2. The market moves favorably. 3. `calculate_trailing_stop` returns a higher stop price. 4. The application updates `open_positions.json` and prints a successful trailing-stop message. 5. No exchange-side order is updated. 6. The market reverses, or the bot loses connectivity or terminates. 7. Binance executes only the origin ...[truncated 794 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Implement exchange-side stop replacement whenever the trailing value changes. 2. Cancel and replace the relevant stop order atomically where the Binance API permits it. 3. Confirm the new order’s status before committing the updated stop value to local state. 4. If replacement fails, retain the confirmed old exchange stop in local state and emit a high-severity alert. 5. Store both values separately, for example: ```json { "calculated_trailing_stop": 45900.00, "confirmed_exchange_stop": 45450.00, "protection_status": "REPLACEMENT_FAILED" } ``` 6. Reconcile all open orders with Binance on startup and periodically during operation. 7. Use unique client order IDs so cancellation and replacement can be retried safely. 8. Handle partial fills, race conditions, and a stop triggering while replacement is underway. 9. Add tests verifying that a local trailing-stop update always corresponds to a confirmed exchange order. 10. Until exchange-side trailing behavior is implemented, remove claims that the feature automatically locks profits and clearly disclose that the value is informational only. ]]>

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (115)

YARA rule 'agent_skill_credential_exfiltration_webhook': AI agent skill credential harvesting followed by webhook or external exfiltration [agent_skills]

Critical
Category
YARA Match
Content
""

import sys
import json
import os
import time
import subprocess
import threading
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
from pathlib import Path
import urllib.request
import urllib.error
import hashlib
import hmac
import concurrent.futures
from collections import deque

# ==========================================
# CONFIGURATION
# ==========================================
BINANCE_API_KEY = os.getenv("BINANCE_API_KEY")
BINANCE_API_SECRET = os.getenv("BINANCE_API_SECRET")
TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN = os.getenv("TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN")
TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID = os.getenv("TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID")

WORKSPACE = Path("/workspace")
ORACLE_SCRIPT = Path("/workspace/skills/crypto-sniper-oracle/crypto_oracle.py")
PROJECTS_FILE = WORKSPACE / "trading_projects.json"
PORTFOLIO_FILE = WORKSPACE / "portfolio_state.json"
TRADES_LOG = WORKSPACE / "trades_history.jsonl"
POSITIONS_FILE = WORKSPACE / "open_positions.json"
PERFORMANCE_FILE = WORKSPACE / "performance_metrics.json"
REPORTS_DIR = WORKSPACE / "reports" / "dail
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding
YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
```bash
# Create secure credentials file
sudo mkdir -p /etc/crypto-executor
sudo nano /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env

# Content:
BINANCE_API_KEY=your_binance_api_key
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The guide instructs storing live Binance and Telegram credentials in a plaintext environment file on disk. Even with restrictive permissions, plaintext secret storage increases the blast radius of host compromise, backups, misconfiguration, and accidental disclosure, especially for a bot that can trade real funds.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
**To use:**
```bash
# Load before running bot
source /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env

# Or use with systemd (see SYSTEMD_SETUP.md)
EnvironmentFile=/etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The documentation tells users or agents to source a file containing exchange and messaging secrets into the current shell environment. That exposes credentials broadly to subprocesses, shell inspection, crash dumps, and any subsequently executed external code, including the separately installed oracle dependency.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
source /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env

# Or use with systemd (see SYSTEMD_SETUP.md)
EnvironmentFile=/etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env
```

**Why this is better:**
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
Referencing the same plaintext credential file from systemd continues the design of storing high-value API secrets in a locally readable file. While common operationally, it remains sensitive because compromise of the host or service configuration can reveal live trading credentials.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
# Load credentials into current session
# Why: executor.py reads these via os.getenv() at startup.
#      Without them, bot exits immediately with [ERROR] Missing Binance credentials
source /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env

# Verify credentials loaded
echo "API Key set: ${BINANCE_API_KEY:0:8}..."   # Shows first 8 chars only (security)
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
This is another explicit instruction to source live API credentials into the shell before launching the bot. In context, that is especially risky because the same guide later encourages cloning and executing additional code, increasing the chance that secrets leak to child processes or malicious dependencies.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
Runs: ls /workspace/skills/crypto-executor/executor.py
↓
✅ File exists → skips installation entirely
   Runs: source /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env
   Runs: python3 /workspace/skills/crypto-executor/executor.py
↓
Bot starts in <5 seconds, loads learned_config.json automatically
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
This example workflow normalizes an agent loading real exchange credentials and immediately executing the trading bot, reinforcing an unsafe autonomous path with direct access to funds. Combined with persistence and external dependency installation, it materially raises the risk of unauthorized trades or credential abuse if any part of the chain is compromised.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
ls /workspace/skills/crypto-executor/executor.py

# ✅ Already installed → just launch:
source /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env
python3 /workspace/skills/crypto-executor/executor.py

# ❌ Not installed → full install (run once):
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The instructions explicitly source a credentials file into the shell environment before executing the trading bot, exposing high-value Binance API secrets to the process environment. In combination with shell, file, and network capabilities, this creates a strong path for credential misuse, accidental leakage, or unauthorized live trading if the skill or its dependencies are compromised.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
WorkingDirectory=/workspace/skills/crypto-executor

# Credentials — loaded from secure file (see Security section below)
# Create /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env first (chmod 600, root-owned)
EnvironmentFile=/etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env

# Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
WorkingDirectory=/workspace/skills/crypto-executor

# Credentials — loaded from secure file (see Security section below)
# Create /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env first (chmod 600, root-owned)
EnvironmentFile=/etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env

# Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
WorkingDirectory=/workspace/skills/crypto-executor

# Credentials — loaded from secure file (see Security section below)
# Create /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env first (chmod 600, root-owned)
EnvironmentFile=/etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env

# Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
WorkingDirectory=/workspace/skills/crypto-executor

# Credentials — loaded from secure file (see Security section below)
# Create /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env first (chmod 600, root-owned)
EnvironmentFile=/etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env

# Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
WorkingDirectory=/workspace/skills/crypto-executor

# Credentials — loaded from secure file (see Security section below)
# Create /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env first (chmod 600, root-owned)
EnvironmentFile=/etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env

# Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
WorkingDirectory=/workspace/skills/crypto-executor

# Credentials — loaded from secure file (see Security section below)
# Create /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env first (chmod 600, root-owned)
EnvironmentFile=/etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env

# Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
WorkingDirectory=/workspace/skills/crypto-executor

# Credentials — loaded from secure file (see Security section below)
# Create /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env first (chmod 600, root-owned)
EnvironmentFile=/etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env

# Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
WorkingDirectory=/workspace/skills/crypto-executor

# Credentials — loaded from secure file (see Security section below)
# Create /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env first (chmod 600, root-owned)
EnvironmentFile=/etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env

# Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
WorkingDirectory=/workspace/skills/crypto-executor

# Credentials — loaded from secure file (see Security section below)
# Create /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env first (chmod 600, root-owned)
EnvironmentFile=/etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env

# Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
- ✅ Credentials not visible in `systemctl status` output
- ✅ File protected chmod 600 (root only)
- ✅ Not exposed in process list (`ps aux`)
- ✅ Shared with manual runs: `source /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env`

---
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding
The statement that the root-owned credentials file can be 'shared with manual runs' using source /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env encourages loading exchange API keys directly into an interactive shell environment. That increases the chance of accidental exposure through shell history, debugging output, inherited subprocess environments, or operator misuse.

Missing User Warnings

High
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The notifier sends trade execution and performance details to Telegram, a third-party service, without any guardrail to minimize shared data or require explicit informed consent at the point of use. In a financial trading skill, external transmission of holdings, positions, and performance can leak sensitive financial activity and operational patterns outside the local environment.

Missing User Warnings

High
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill places live market and OCO orders automatically with no explicit user confirmation, dry-run default, or mandatory safety interlock. In a plugin/agent context, autonomous trade execution against real exchange credentials is highly dangerous because any bad signal, poisoned dependency, or logic flaw immediately affects real funds.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
## 🚀 Step 1: Binance API Setup

### **Create API Key**

1. Login to https://binance.com
2. Profile → API Management
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
# Method 1: Use bot
# 1. Send any message to your bot
# 2. Visit (replace YOUR_TOKEN):
https://api.telegram.org/botYOUR_TOKEN/getUpdates

# 3. Find "chat":{"id":123456789}
# 4. Save CHAT_ID
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
# Method 1: Use bot
# 1. Send any message to your bot
# 2. Visit (replace YOUR_TOKEN):
https://api.telegram.org/botYOUR_TOKEN/getUpdates

# 3. Find "chat":{"id":123456789}
# 4. Save CHAT_ID
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
DRAWDOWN_KILL_PCT=10

# Secure the file
sudo chmod 600 /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env
sudo chown root:root /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env
```
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
DRAWDOWN_KILL_PCT=10

# Secure the file
sudo chmod 600 /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env
sudo chown root:root /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env
```
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
DRAWDOWN_KILL_PCT=10

# Secure the file
sudo chmod 600 /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env
sudo chown root:root /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env
```
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.