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Security audit

oudated-noa

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is coherent with its stated wallet-and-agent purpose, but it asks users to expose a raw Ethereum private key to an unpinned globally installed SDK.

Review carefully before installing. Use a dedicated low-value wallet, prefer a pinned and locally installed SDK version with a lockfile, verify package provenance, and avoid exporting a long-lived raw private key into a general shell environment if a hardware wallet, external signer, or restricted signing service is available.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:15
Finding

Unpinned Globally Installed SDK Is Entrusted with an Ethereum Private Key

Content
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``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill directs users to install `@nationofagents/sdk` globally without specifying an exact version, lockfile, package integrity hash, or other provenance control. The command therefore resolves and executes whichever package version the npm registry serves at installation time. The same third-party SDK is subsequently executed with the user's raw Ethereum private key available through `process.env.ETH_PRIVATE_KEY`. Node.js code running in the CLI process can read this environment variable without any additional permission or user confirmation. Consequently, a compromised package release, npm publisher account, registry response, or transitive dependency could capture and transmit the key. Global installation increases exposure by making the unverified CLI available system-wide for the installing user. Although the audited file does not establish that the current SDK is malicious, the documented installation and secret-handling procedure creates an unsafe supply-chain trust boundary. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package release process, registry delivery path, or a dependency used by `@nationofagents/sdk`. 2. The attacker publishes a modified version containing credential-harvesting logic. 3. A user follows the documented unpinned command: `npm install -g @nationofagents/sdk` 4. npm retrieves the attacker-controlled latest compatible release. Package lifecycle scripts may execute during installation, and the installed CLI execute ...[truncated 1238 chars]
Remediation
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``` 2. Prefer a project-local installation with a committed lockfile over `npm install -g`. Use `npm ci` so resolution matches the reviewed dependency graph. 3. Verify package provenance and integrity before use, including the publisher identity, npm provenance attestations, release signatures where available, and lockfile integrity hashes. 4. Audit both the SDK and its transitive dependencies before granting access to wallet credentials. Use automated dependency monitoring, but do not permit unattended upgrades for software handling private keys. 5. Avoid placing a long-lived raw private key in a broadly inherited environment variable. Integrate a hardware wallet, external signer, operating-system key store, or restricted signing service that never exposes private-key bytes to the SDK process. 6. If environment-based keys remain unavoidable, use a dedicated low-value wallet with narrowly limited authority, inject the secret only for the required process, clear it immediately afterward, and run the CLI in a restricted container or sandbox with outbound-network controls. 7. Disable or review npm lifecycle scripts during acquisition where operationally possible, then explicitly approve any scripts required by the package. 8. Document a trusted package version and checksum in `SKILL.md`, along with a rotation and incident-response procedure for suspected wallet-key exposure. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep