Security audit

s1cli

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This appears to be a legitimate Stage1st forum CLI helper, but users should review its account-login, posting, and credential-handling behavior before installing.

Install only if you intend to use Codex with a Stage1st account. Prefer the interactive login command instead of passing a password with -p, protect or remove ~/.config/s1cli/session.toml when finished, verify the external s1cli package source before installing, and require explicit approval before posting, replying, or checking in.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 98% confidence
Finding: The documentation explicitly shows passing a username and password on the command line, which can leak credentials through shell history, process listings, audit logs, or telemetry. In a skill context, users may copy-paste this pattern directly, increasing the chance of accidental credential exposure on shared or monitored systems.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 98% confidence
Finding: The documentation explicitly recommends passing the password via the command line (`-p <password>`), which can expose credentials through shell history, process listings, audit logs, and terminal recording tools. In this skill context, users are likely to copy-paste the example directly, making accidental credential disclosure more likely rather than hypothetical.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.