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Security audit

YYClaw

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s YYClaw API purpose is coherent, but it mishandles API keys and uses broad activation for paid external calls.

Review before installing. Use this only if you are comfortable sending prompts and account queries to YYClaw and potentially spending prepaid/on-chain credit. Do not let the agent print your API key or paste it into chat; configure it privately as an environment secret, and confirm before any billable model call.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:88
Finding

API Key Exposure Through Console Output and Conversation Logs

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 88–92
Vulnerability Type: Secret exposure through insecure credential handling
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

bash
### Reading API Key
```bash
echo $YYCLAW_API_KEY

If not set, ask the user to provide it or direct them to https://crypto.yyclaw.cc to get one.

text

### Technical Analysis

The skill explicitly instructs the agent to print `YYCLAW_API_KEY`. Printing a secret is not necessary to determine whether the variable is configured. The resulting value may be retained in terminal output, agent transcripts, execution logs, monitoring systems, or debugging records.

The fallback instruction to ask the user to provide the key can also cause the credential to be entered directly into a conversation. Such conversations may be stored or made accessible to systems and personnel that do not require access to the credential.

This violates least-exposure principles for secret handling. Although sending the key in an authorization header to the declared YYClaw API is necessary for authenticated operations, displaying it or accepting it through ordinary conversational input is not necessary.

### Attack Path

1. A user invokes the YYClaw skill without the agent first confirming whether the environment variable is safely configured.
2. The agent follows `SKILL.md` and executes `echo $YYCLAW_API_KEY`, or asks the user to provide the key in the conversation.
3. The plaintext API key appears in terminal output, an agent transcript, or associated logs.
4. A person or system with access to those records obtains the credential.
5. The exposed key is replayed against the YYClaw API to perform authenticated operations.

### Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could allow unauthorized use of paid model calls and access to API-key-scoped account information, including balance, remaining credit, wallet address, spending information, and
...[truncated 450 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Remove echo $YYCLAW_API_KEY and never display the credential.

  • Check only whether the variable exists, without revealing its value:

    bash
    if [ -n "${YYCLAW_API_KEY:-}" ]; then
      echo "YYCLAW_API_KEY is configured"
    else
      echo "YYCLAW_API_KEY is not configured"
    fi
    
  • Do not ask users to paste API keys into ordinary chat or command-line arguments.

  • Direct users to configure the key through a secret manager, protected environment configuration, or another private credential-entry mechanism.

  • Ensure application, proxy, and agent logs redact Authorization headers and values matching the sk-yy- key format.

  • Apply minimum necessary permissions, spending limits, expiration, rotation, and revocation controls to issued API keys.

  • Obtain explicit user approval before transmitting prompts containing confidential information to the third-party gateway.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 96)May include surrounding context.

Check Balance

bash
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $YYCLAW_API_KEY" https://crypto.yyclaw.cc/v1/balance | python3 -m json.tool

Check Usage

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 101)May include surrounding context.

Check Usage

bash
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $YYCLAW_API_KEY" https://crypto.yyclaw.cc/v1/usage?limit=10 | python3 -m json.tool

List Models

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 106)May include surrounding context.

List Models

bash
curl -s https://crypto.yyclaw.cc/v1/models | python3 -m json.tool

Call a Model

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to send prompts, balance queries, and usage requests to an external service without clearly warning that user content, wallet-linked account data, and API key-authenticated metadata will be transmitted off-platform. This omission weakens informed consent and increases privacy risk, particularly because usage and balance endpoints expose financial and account details.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The model-call example transmits user-supplied prompt content to an external third-party endpoint using a bearer token tied to a paid account. In this skill context that behavior is expected, but it is still security-relevant because sensitive user data could be exfiltrated to the provider and the call may incur charges.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 111)May include surrounding context.

Call a Model

bash
curl -s -X POST https://crypto.yyclaw.cc/v1/chat/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $YYCLAW_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"gemini-3-flash","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"Hello"}]}'

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger 'Any mention of calling AI models through YYClaw' is overly broad and could cause the skill to activate in contexts where the user is only discussing YYClaw rather than consenting to use it. Because the skill performs authenticated external API calls tied to billing and account metadata, accidental activation can lead to unintended data transmission and paid actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.