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Security audit

Musk First Principles

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a text-only analysis framework skill with no code execution, credential access, persistence, or hidden data handling.

Install only if you want a Chinese-first Musk/first-principles consulting framework. Verify any dated business, investment, or technology claims independently before relying on them for decisions.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill specifies Chinese as the primary language without indicating that the user can choose another language. This can override user preference or system behavior, creating an avoidable instruction conflict and reducing transparency around how the skill will respond.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The activation phrases are very broad and overlap with ordinary consulting, strategy, and decision-support requests, so the skill may be invoked outside the user's clear intent. That can cause instruction hijacking at the orchestration layer, unexpected persona takeover, or inappropriate application of the skill's domain-specific framing to unrelated requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.