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Security audit

Clawhub Skill Optimizer

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is an advisory ClawHub growth and SEO guide with disclosed example code and no installed tools or automatic execution.

Before installing, understand that this is a strategy and template skill, not an automated optimizer. If you copy and run its example code, you are responsible for any third-party API requests, privacy exposure, package versions, and manual edits or social posts you make from its suggestions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (11)

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The document claims it does not execute code and then includes executable Python and shell snippets, creating a trust-boundary mismatch. Users or downstream systems may rely on the safety framing and underestimate the operational and privacy risks of copying those examples, especially where the snippets make network requests to third parties.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 340)May include surrounding context.

md
### 3. SEO Title & Description Optimizer
/ SEO标题与描述优化器

Rewrite skill titles and descriptions using proven SEO frameworks to maximize search visibility and click-through rate.

**Title Optimization Framework:**

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 604)May include surrounding context.

markdown
# [English Title] / [中文标题]

<!-- English (for international users - put FIRST) -->
> **English Description**: One powerful sentence describing the skill's core value.
> Built for [target user]. Solves [specific problem].

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The workflow's 'Apply' step presents self-modifying actions against SKILL.md and README.md, which can be interpreted by agents or users as authorization to alter the skill's own files. Even though a later note narrows this to manual user action, the contradictory instruction increases the chance of unsafe autonomous behavior in wrappers that act on imperative workflow text.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 844)May include surrounding context.

↓ User confirms changes ↓ Apply: Update SKILL.md + README.md + tags + thumbnail prompts + changelog

text

> **执行边界提示**:上图中 "Apply" 一步指**用户确认后由用户自行完成的操作**。本技能只产出建议、报告与素材文案,不代用户修改任何技能文件、不代发任何内容。

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The workflow says 'Apply: Update SKILL.md + README.md + tags + thumbnail prompts + changelog,' which conflicts with repeated statements that the skill never modifies files. Contradictory autonomy claims are dangerous because they can mislead operators, reviewers, or agent wrappers about whether the skill may perform self-modifying actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 271)May include surrounding context.

md
def fetch_github_trending(lang: str = "python", limit: int = 10) -> list[dict]:
    """Fetch GitHub trending repositories."""
    url = f"https://api.github.com/search/repositories"
    params = {
        "q": f"language:{lang}+created:>2025-01-01",
        "sort": "stars", "order": "desc", "per_page": limit

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The template comment explicitly says English should be put first for international users, which is a natural-language locale preference embedded in the skill guidance. Although later text softens this requirement elsewhere, this line itself presents a prescriptive language-order rule rather than offering a neutral choice at the point of use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.