T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
roles/release.md:79- Finding
Autonomous Production Deployment Without Explicit User Authorization
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
roles/release.md:79-80
Related Locations:SKILL.md:77-79;roles/qa.md:50-54
Vulnerability Type: Deployment authorization and privilege-boundary weakness
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code Snippet
markdown ### Phase 6: Ship (Release) - `/ship` - Deploy to production - QA passed before deploymarkdown 5. All issues fixed → Re-test 6. QA passes → Spawn Release to deploy 7. **Notify Coordinator ({username}-ceo)** - tell what you didmarkdown ### Step 3: Deploy - Execute deployment - Monitor progressTechnical Analysis
The workflow treats an internal QA result as sufficient authorization for a production deployment. It does not require explicit confirmation from the user immediately before deployment, constrain the release agent to an approved environment, define an allowlist of deployment operations, or require validation of the identity and integrity of the QA approval.
The release agent may therefore use whatever ambient deployment credentials and tools are available to the host agent. This conflates quality approval with authorization to modify production infrastructure. Although the instructions require QA to pass first, QA approval is not an adequate security boundary or substitute for authorization by the system owner.
Attack Path
- A user task, project artifact, test result, or other untrusted content influences the QA agent's assessment.
- The QA agent records a passing result or is otherwise induced to continue the workflow.
- Under
roles/qa.md, the QA agent spawns the release agent automatically. - The release agent follows
roles/release.mdand executes a deployment. - If ambient production credentials are available, production resources are modified without a separate user authorization checkpoint.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could cause unauthorized production changes within the scope of credentials available to the release ...[truncated 482 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Require explicit, fresh user confirmation immediately before every production deployment.
- Separate QA approval from release authorization and verify both as distinct, authenticated decisions.
- Default release operations to a dry run or staging environment.
- Allowlist deployment environments, repositories, branches, commands, and resource scopes.
- Use short-lived, least-privilege deployment credentials that cannot access unrelated projects or environments.
- Display the exact version, commit, target environment, planned commands, and rollback procedure before requesting approval.
- Reject approvals originating only from shared memory or untrusted project content; use signed or otherwise integrity-protected workflow state.
- Maintain immutable deployment audit logs and require automatic rollback or a manual stop when verification fails.
