ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

Gcalcli

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This calendar helper is purpose-aligned, but it directs agents to run a custom GitHub fork and bulk export sensitive meeting notes to local files without enough scoping or handling guidance.

Install only if you trust the custom gcalcli fork and any local gcmd checkout it runs. Replace the hard-coded calendar and paths with your own intended targets, avoid bulk exports unless explicitly needed, use a secure non-shared output directory, and clear or revoke cached Google credentials on shared or less trusted machines.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The documentation explicitly instructs users to bulk export meeting attachments and Gemini-generated notes to local files without any sensitivity warning, access-control guidance, or data-handling precautions. Because calendar attachments and meeting notes commonly contain confidential business information, this increases the risk of unnecessary data exfiltration, oversharing, and insecure local persistence.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.