Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected
ClawHub Security flagged this skill as suspicious. Review the scan results before using.
push-task-to-negative-screen
v1.0.17通用任务结果推送器,当任务完成后将结果推送到负一屏。使用统一的标准数据格式,支持各种类型的任务结果推送。
⭐ 0· 131·0 current·0 all-time
byMinus One Screen@ganhaiyang3
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
OpenClaw
Suspicious
medium confidencePurpose & Capability
The skill's name/description (push task results to the 'negative screen') matches the code: the scripts format JSON and POST it to a configured pushServiceUrl using an authCode. However the package metadata claims no required config paths or credentials while the runtime code explicitly reads the user's OpenClaw global config (~/.openclaw/openclaw.json) for authCode and pushServiceUrl. That config-file access was not declared in the skill metadata and is a notable mismatch.
Instruction Scope
SKILL.md stays on-purpose: it requires JSON input, instructs using openclaw config to set authCode/pushServiceUrl, and describes update checks. The code includes an auth manager that can detect an auth code inside arbitrary text (e.g., conversation text) and return an OpenClaw config command; while implemented locally, that behaviour could be used to parse chat content for tokens if the agent invokes it. The SKILL.md warns users not to paste auth codes in chat but the presence of detection logic is a privacy surface to be aware of.
Install Mechanism
There is no install script; dependencies are standard Python (requests) listed in requirements.txt. No remote downloads or archive extraction are used. This is low install risk, but the code must be inspected and you must install requirements yourself (pip install requests).
Credentials
The skill metadata declares no required env vars or config paths, yet config.py reads ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json to obtain authCode and pushServiceUrl. Reading a global config file is broader access than declared. While the code attempts to only use the skills.entries.today-task.config subtree, opening the whole file exposes it in memory and is a disproportionate access that should have been declared.
Persistence & Privilege
The skill writes local logs and optional push_records (logs/ and push_records/). This is expected for an uploader, and the SKILL.md/SECURITY.md claim the authCode is masked in logs. However you should verify that saved records do not inadvertently include full authCode or other secrets; the code masks authCode in some log summaries but full push payloads are sent to the configured endpoint (as required). The skill is not 'always: true' and does not request elevated system privileges.
What to consider before installing
High-level points to check before installing:
1) Config file access not declared: the code reads ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json for the skill config. If that file contains other secrets or configuration you do not want accessed, review the file and the code's exact read behavior. Prefer setting only the minimal today-task config entry.
2) Endpoint and data flow: the skill will POST your authCode, task_content and metadata to the configured pushServiceUrl. Default URL is a Huawei domain (hiboard-claw-drcn.ai.dbankcloud.cn). If you are uncomfortable with that destination, set pushServiceUrl to a trusted endpoint or run in dry-run mode for testing.
3) Local storage & logs: the skill creates logs/ and push_records/ and may save push responses. SECURITY.md says authCode is masked in logs, but you should inspect the saved files (or disable save_records) to ensure full tokens are not persistently stored.
4) Chat-based auth detection: scripts include an AuthCodeManager that can detect tokens in arbitrary text. Avoid pasting auth codes into chat; prefer setting authCode via openclaw config commands as instructed.
5) Network activity: update_checker and the push client perform outbound network requests (to ClawHub and to your configured pushServiceUrl). If network egress is a concern, run the skill in an isolated environment or disable update checks.
6) Recommended actions: review the code files (task_push.py, task_pusher.py, hiboards_client.py, config.py) to confirm what is logged and stored; set save_records=false if you don't want local records; set pushServiceUrl to a destination you control for testing; consider running the skill in a container or limited environment.
Given the declared purpose is coherent with the code, but the undeclared global-config file access and the presence of auth-detection logic increase privacy risk, proceed only after reviewing/limiting configuration and storage settings.Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
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License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
