T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
README.md:109- Finding
Mutable External Code Is Retrieved and Executed Without Verifiable Pinning
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
README.md:109-111,README.md:159, andREADME.md:181-184
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and supply-chain exposure
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
bash git clone https://github.com/galpha-ai/gasless-crosschain-executor.git cd gasless-crosschain-executor ./scripts/install.sh --target <agent>The setup documentation further states:
bash pip install -r requirements.txt cd examples && npm install && cd ..Technical Analysis
The installation procedure clones a mutable Git repository and subsequently executes its installation and setup scripts. It does not pin the clone to an audited commit, verify a cryptographic checksum or signature, or otherwise establish that the downloaded content matches the reviewed artifact.
The audited package contains only Markdown documentation and a sample JSON plan. It does not contain the referenced
scripts/,examples/, dependency manifests, lockfiles, or test files. Consequently, the behavior ofinstall.sh,setup.sh, Python dependencies, Node dependencies, wallet generators, signing helpers, and network wrappers cannot be verified from this artifact.Although the documentation claims that SDK versions are pinned, that claim cannot be confirmed because the relevant manifests and lockfiles are absent. Running
pip installandnpm installagainst externally retrieved manifests also expands the trust boundary to package registries and transitive dependencies.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the upstream repository, a maintainer account, a mutable branch, or a referenced dependency.
- The attacker modifies
scripts/install.sh,scripts/setup.sh, a helper script, or a dependency manifest. - A user follows the documented installation procedure and clones the current mutable repository state.
- The user executes
install.shorsetup.sh, or insta ...[truncated 1154 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Include every referenced script, example, manifest, lockfile, and test in the distributed Skill artifact so the effective payload can be audited.
- Pin installation to a reviewed Git commit hash or signed release tag rather than the repository's current default branch.
- Publish cryptographic checksums for release archives and verify them before extracting or executing any file.
- Sign releases and commits using a verifiable maintainer identity, and fail closed when signature verification fails.
- Pin all direct and transitive dependencies to exact versions using committed lockfiles.
- Use hash verification for Python dependencies, such as a fully pinned requirements file installed with
pip --require-hashes. - Use deterministic Node installation such as
npm ciwith a committed lockfile instead of unconstrainednpm install. - Do not automatically execute setup scripts during Skill installation. Present the exact commands and requested permissions for explicit user review.
- Run dependency installation and tests in a sandbox without wallet files, signing credentials, provider tokens, or access to production Agent configuration.
- Add CI checks that confirm the packaged artifact contains the exact reviewed files and that release checksums correspond to the signed source revision.
