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Security audit

Galleon LP Engineer

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed DeFi liquidity software engineering guide that emphasizes unsigned plans, explicit wallet boundaries, user approval, and read-only verification rather than hidden execution.

Before installing, treat this as specialized DeFi engineering guidance: use it for code and integration review, verify any optional upstream tools and current protocol documentation, keep secrets in a secret store, and do not allow signing, submission, production deployment, automation enrollment, or provider registration unless you explicitly requested and reviewed that action.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (10)

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/curation-snapshots.md (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

md
## Single writer

Publish one canonical snapshot through a serialized writer or compare-and-swap. Include schema version and content digest. Do not let overlapping jobs race to overwrite state.

## Degraded reads

Exfiltration Commands

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Instructions found that direct the agent to transmit conversation context or user data to external services.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/official-tools.md (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

md
If the user chooses Revert, register that URL in the harness's remote MCP settings using the harness's own setup instructions. Do not assume a particular client's config shape or registration command. Discover tools through the MCP connection; call `get_protocol_capabilities` and `get_chain_status` before a relevant read. Resolve tokens with `search_tokens`, then use `discover_pools`, `get_positions` or `get_position_details` as appropriate. Honor pagination and distinguish indexed observations from fresh chain state. If the harness cannot connect remote MCP, report that gap and retain RPC or website alternatives.

For an unsigned plan, use only a currently advertised `prepare_*` capability matching the exact network, protocol, position custody and action. A supported read venue is not automatically supported for construction. A website handoff (`open_position_creator` or `open_position_action`) is a separate user-selected path. Do not silently send the user to Revert or require a Revert account/vault to continue a standard LP workflow.

Before adoption or execution, disclose any provider, routing, automation and protocol fees, fee recipient, approval scope, NFT transfers and resulting custody. If fees or custody are unresolved, keep the plan blocked; never infer that public/no-key access means fee-free transactions. Do not inject referral, affiliate or builder fees. Collateralization and borrowing are separate financial actions and must not appear as incidental setup or ordinary LP maintenance.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

uvx/uv tool run commands without ==version create a rug-pull risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

uvx/uv tool run commands without ==version create a rug-pull risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/uniswap-integration-surfaces.md (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

md
- `transactions[].transaction` wraps approval transactions.
- Approval checks can return both onchain transactions and typed permit data.
- Permission or KYC warnings are a blocking result even when no approval transaction is returned.
- Amounts are integer base-unit strings.
- Position ID and permit field names vary by endpoint.
- Tick-snapped adjusted prices are distinct from requested prices.

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/uniswap-integration-surfaces.md (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

md
- [Uniswap AI skills](https://developers.uniswap.org/docs/uniswap-ai/skills)
- [Uniswap AI LP integration](https://github.com/Uniswap/uniswap-ai/tree/main/packages/plugins/uniswap-trading/skills/lp-integration)
- [Uniswap AI v4 SDK integration](https://github.com/Uniswap/uniswap-ai/blob/main/packages/plugins/uniswap-trading/skills/v4-sdk-integration/SKILL.md)
- [Uniswap LP API guide](https://developers.uniswap.org/docs/liquidity/liquidity-provisioning-api/integration-guide)

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.