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Security audit

Hyperliquid Execution

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a tightly scoped Hyperliquid trading execution workflow that requires explicit user approval and a trusted signer before any financial action.

Before installing, understand that this skill is intended for real trading actions and should only be used with a reviewed ticket, exact `approve <ticket-id>` confirmation, and a trusted signer or approved API wallet boundary. Do not paste private keys or seed phrases into the agent, and prefer pinned, reviewed versions for any optional SDK or related-skill installation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The document instructs use of npx skills add ... without pinning an exact package version or integrity source, which can cause execution of whatever package version is current at install time. In a security-sensitive trading skill chain, that creates a supply-chain risk: a compromised or malicious upstream release could be fetched and executed in the user's environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/official-tools.md (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

For HTTP-capable harnesses, use the official Info endpoint directly for reads. The equivalent metadata request is:

sh
curl --fail-with-body https://api.hyperliquid.xyz/info \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  --data '{"type":"meta"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/official-tools.md (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

For HTTP-capable harnesses, use the official Info endpoint directly for reads. The equivalent metadata request is:

sh
curl --fail-with-body https://api.hyperliquid.xyz/info \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  --data '{"type":"meta"}'

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.