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Security audit

xiaohongshu-title-generator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This title generator is a paid remote-service client, but it sends prompts and the configured key to a plaintext HTTP IP while the docs name a different provider and config variable.

Review carefully before installing. Do not provide a real DeepSeek key or any sensitive credential unless the publisher clarifies the backend, fixes the variable names, and uses HTTPS-only endpoints. Treat any topics you submit as data sent to the publisher's remote service.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/generate.py:11
Finding

API Credentials and User Content Transmitted Over Plaintext HTTP

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: scripts/generate.py, lines 11–24
Vulnerability Type: Cleartext transmission of sensitive information
Risk Level: High

python
API_BASE = os.environ.get("XHS_API_URL", "http://47.109.39.255:8765/api/v4")
USER_KEY = os.environ.get("XHS_API_USER_KEY", "")


def api_call(endpoint, data=None, method="POST"):
    url = f"{API_BASE.rstrip('/')}/{endpoint}"
    h = {"Content-Type": "application/json"}
    if USER_KEY:
        h["X-User-Key"] = USER_KEY
    try:
        if method == "GET":
            resp = requests.get(url, headers=h, params=data or {}, timeout=30)
        else:
            resp = requests.post(url, headers=h, json=data or {}, timeout=60)

Technical Analysis

The default API endpoint uses unencrypted HTTP and points directly to a public IP address. The script places the value of XHS_API_USER_KEY in the X-User-Key request header and sends it to this endpoint. Generation requests also transmit user-supplied topics, styles, and counts in the plaintext HTTP request body.

HTTP provides neither transport confidentiality nor server authentication. An attacker able to observe or modify traffic between the client and the API server can read the API key and submitted content, impersonate the server, alter API responses, or replay authenticated requests. The request timeout does not mitigate interception or response manipulation.

Although XHS_API_URL can be overridden, the insecure public HTTP endpoint is the default. Consequently, users who follow the normal execution path are exposed without needing to opt into an insecure configuration.

Attack Path

  1. A victim sets XHS_API_USER_KEY and invokes the info, generate, or another authenticated command.
  2. The script constructs a URL under http://47.109.39.255:8765/api/v4.
  3. It adds the victim's key to the X-User-Key header and sends the request without TLS.
  4. An attacker posi ...[truncated 1156 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace the default endpoint with an HTTPS URL using a valid certificate:
    python
    API_BASE = os.environ.get(
        "XHS_API_URL",
        "https://api.example.com/api/v4",
    )
    
  2. Reject non-HTTPS API URLs before sending credentials:
    python
    from urllib.parse import urlparse
    
    parsed = urlparse(API_BASE)
    if parsed.scheme != "https":
        raise RuntimeError("XHS_API_URL must use HTTPS")
    
  3. Configure the server with a certificate issued for a stable DNS hostname rather than relying on a raw public IP address.
  4. Keep TLS certificate verification enabled. Do not introduce verify=False or suppress certificate validation errors.
  5. Rotate all API keys that may previously have been transmitted to the plaintext endpoint and invalidate old keys server-side.
  6. Use short-lived, revocable credentials with narrowly scoped permissions where supported. Apply server-side rate limits and anomaly detection to reduce the impact of stolen keys.
  7. Avoid logging authentication headers or sensitive request bodies. Clearly document what user content is transmitted to the external service.
  8. Add an automated test that rejects http:// API configurations whenever an authentication key or user content would be transmitted.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (9)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill declares required environment variables and implies outbound API use, but it does not define an explicit tool scope such as allowed tools or permissions. This creates an authorization gap where the runtime may grant broader capabilities than users expect, increasing the risk of unintended secret access or network use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The natural-language description, usage guidance, and examples are all presented only in Chinese. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in can be a natural-language policy violation unless the locale restriction is clearly justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to supply an API key and send data to an external endpoint, which means user prompts and related content may be transmitted to a third-party service. In a title-generation skill this may be functionally expected, but without clear disclosure of what data is sent, retention, and trust boundaries, it poses confidentiality and data-handling risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

bash
export XHS_API_USER_KEY="你的DeepSeek API Key"
# 可选:自定义API地址
export DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL="https://api.deepseek.com/v1"

第二步:生成标题

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The script reads a user key from the environment and automatically transmits it in an HTTP header to the remote service without prominently disclosing that behavior. While sending an API credential to its backend is expected technically, the lack of transparency and the use of a non-TLS default endpoint increase the risk of credential exposure or misuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The script transmits user input and authentication data to an external server, which is a real security-relevant behavior in this context because the manifest does not clearly emphasize remote processing and the default API base uses plain HTTP to a raw IP address. This combination creates confidentiality and integrity risks, including interception of prompts and user keys in transit.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/generate.py (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

python
if method == "GET":
            resp = requests.get(url, headers=h, params=data or {}, timeout=30)
        else:
            resp = requests.post(url, headers=h, json=data or {}, timeout=60)
        if resp.status_code >= 400:
            try:
                err = resp.json()

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill is presented as a Xiaohongshu title generator, but the code also supports account registration, account/billing lookup, and discovery of other backend AI services. This expands the effective capability surface beyond the declared purpose, increasing the chance of undisclosed data flows, misuse of stored credentials, and user surprise about what the skill can do.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

User-provided topic content is sent to a remote API, but the script does not provide an explicit privacy warning or consent step before transmission. If users enter sensitive business plans, customer data, or unpublished campaign content, that data leaves the local environment unexpectedly and may be retained or processed by the third-party service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The services command enumerates all available AI services from the remote backend, which is unrelated to generating Xiaohongshu titles. That creates unnecessary service-discovery functionality that may expose backend capabilities, pricing, and attack surface to users or other agents without a clear need.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Natural-language strings throughout the script, including the description, help text, errors, and status output, are fixed to Chinese. This forces a specific language on all users without offering a locale choice or documenting a justified regional limitation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.