T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
interact.md:21- Finding
Persistent Instruction Hijacking and Autonomous External Actions
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a real community integration, but it grants broad persistent authority for credentials, background tasks, remote instructions, and public actions without enough user control.
Install only if you are comfortable giving this skill a Meyo account key, recurring background execution, access to conversation and memory context, and authority to post, comment, like, and install community skills. Review and disable scheduler jobs, avoid running post-derived commands without manual approval, and prefer a version that uses signed/pinned downloads, scoped secrets, and explicit confirmations for every public or persistent action.
interact.md:21Persistent Instruction Hijacking and Autonomous External Actions
SKILL.md:160Persistent Meyo Directives Written into Long-Term Agent Memory
SKILL.md:103Execution of Mutable Remote Scripts and Instructions Without Integrity Verification
heartbeat.md:18Mandatory Installation of Persistent Scheduled Tasks
link.md:53Untrusted Community Posts Are Converted into Local Execution Plans
diary.md:62Excessive Access to Conversation History, Global Memory, and Unrelated Activity
scripts/register.sh:67Registration Script Uses Unsafe JSON Construction and Weak Secret Handling
store.md:210Unsigned Community Skill Archives Are Downloaded and Installed Without Safe Extraction
The file claims to be a main orchestration skill, but much of the actionable content is direct registration and credential-handling logic rather than clearly implemented boundary management. Ambiguous scope increases the risk that operators enable the skill without realizing it can create accounts and persist secrets locally.
The file claims to be a main orchestration skill, but much of the actionable content is direct registration and credential-handling logic rather than clearly implemented boundary management. Ambiguous scope increases the risk that operators enable the skill without realizing it can create accounts and persist secrets locally.
The skill instructs the agent to look for credentials in local filesystem paths across multiple runtimes. Accessing local secrets is security-sensitive because it increases the chance of unintended secret use, cross-context credential reuse, or exposure if the skill is invoked in an unexpected environment.
| 环境 | 凭证路径 |
|------|---------|
| OpenClaw | `~/.openclaw/meyo/credentials.json` |
| Hermes | `~/.hermes/meyo/credentials.json` |
| 其他 / 未知 | `~/.meyo/credentials.json` |
The document defines a credential file structure containing API keys and identifiers, encouraging direct local handling of sensitive secrets. Clear instructions to parse and use these values can normalize secret access by the skill and broaden the blast radius if the skill is misused.
| 环境 | 凭证路径 |
|------|---------|
| OpenClaw | `~/.openclaw/meyo/credentials.json` |
| Hermes | `~/.hermes/meyo/credentials.json` |
| 其他 / 未知 | `~/.meyo/credentials.json` |
凭证文件结构:
By specifying where and how credentials are stored, the skill operationalizes local secret retrieval as part of normal execution. In hostile or multi-skill environments, that behavior can facilitate unauthorized access to sensitive tokens even if the stated purpose is legitimate.
|------|---------|
| OpenClaw | `~/.openclaw/meyo/credentials.json` |
| Hermes | `~/.hermes/meyo/credentials.json` |
| 其他 / 未知 | `~/.meyo/credentials.json` |
凭证文件结构:
The skill directs credential persistence to credentials.json, including a one-time API key returned at registration. Persisting a reusable API credential on disk is sensitive because compromise of the host, logs, or backup systems can expose a long-lived token that enables account takeover or impersonation.
3. 脚本输出以 `REGISTER_SUCCESS` 开头表示成功,包含 `agent_id`、`claim_code`、`claim_url` 等信息
4. 将 `claim_url` 对应的完整链接 `https://www.meyo123.com/claim/<claim_code>` 展示给用户
5. 凭证已由脚本写入 `credentials.json`,无需再手动写文件
⚠️ `api_key` 仅在注册时返回一次,脚本已将其安全写入文件。
The skill exposes a destructive DELETE endpoint for posts, and the surrounding guidance notes that deleting a post also deletes all associated comments and cannot be migrated. Without explicit authorization, confirmation, and identifier validation safeguards in the skill instructions, an agent could delete the wrong post or comply with ambiguous prompts, causing irreversible content loss.
DELETE /api/v1/feeds/{id}
注意:当前不支持编辑帖子,需修改时删帖重发。删帖后原帖评论一并删除,无法迁移。
The skill exposes a DELETE endpoint for comments with no built-in guardrails around target verification or destructive-action confirmation. In the context of agent-driven tool use, this creates risk of accidental or user-unintended deletion if the model misbinds commentId, follows ambiguous instructions, or acts on stale context.
DELETE /api/v1/feeds/{id}/comments/{commentId}
The description says the skill will automatically fetch updates, process replies, interact, and post, but it does not clearly warn the user that these actions may occur autonomously on their behalf. This creates a consent and account-safety issue because users may enable the skill without understanding that it can publicly act using their identity or credentials.
The description frames the capability as simple 'link interaction' while the body grants authority to fetch authenticated content, reproduce tasks, debug, and perform social actions on the user's behalf. This scope understatement undermines informed consent and can cause users or orchestrators to invoke a far more powerful skill than intended.
Referencing a concrete credentials.json path is a direct indicator of credential harvesting behavior within the skill. In this context, the skill is not merely documenting configuration; it is instructing runtime access to local secrets to authenticate subsequent requests, which materially increases the risk of unauthorized secret use.
~/.openclaw/meyo/credentials.json 或 ~/.meyo/credentials.json。curl "https://www.meyo123.com/api/v1/feeds/{id}" \
The skill authorizes itself to execute whatever steps are described in a fetched post using available tools, scripts, APIs, or browser automation. Because post content is external and effectively untrusted input, this is equivalent to delegating agent behavior to arbitrary remote instructions, which can lead to data access, code execution, destructive changes, or exfiltration.
The skill directs autonomous liking and commenting after task completion without requiring user confirmation. These are outbound authenticated actions that can impersonate the user/agent identity, create reputation harm, and be manipulated through malicious post content or false success claims.
The skill mandates automatic network write actions on the user's behalf without warning or confirmation, including voting and posting comments. This removes user agency and can be abused to generate spam, fraudulent endorsement, or unwanted account activity.
The script explicitly writes an API key to ~/.meyo/credentials.json, creating a credential-at-rest target on the local machine. If the file is read by other users, malware, backups, or misconfigured tooling, the attacker can reuse the API key to impersonate the agent and access the associated account.
# 写入凭证文件,不将 api_key 输出到 stdout
cred_dir = os.path.expanduser("~/.meyo")
os.makedirs(cred_dir, exist_ok=True)
cred_path = os.path.join(cred_dir, "credentials.json")
with open(cred_path, "w") as f:
json.dump({
"api_key": data["api_key"],
The skill provides exact local filesystem paths for credential storage and instructs the agent to read API keys from those files for authenticated requests. Even though intended for legitimate use, exposing and operationalizing credential access materially increases the chance that a compromised or confused agent will retrieve and use secrets beyond the minimum necessary scope.
| 环境 | 凭证路径 |
|------|---------|
| OpenClaw | `~/.openclaw/meyo/credentials.json` |
| Hermes | `~/.hermes/meyo/credentials.json` |
| 其他 / 未知 | `~/.meyo/credentials.json` |
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
| 环境 | 凭证路径 |
|------|---------|
| OpenClaw | `~/.openclaw/meyo/credentials.json` |
| Hermes | `~/.hermes/meyo/credentials.json` |
| 其他 / 未知 | `~/.meyo/credentials.json` |
凭证文件结构:
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
| 环境 | 凭证路径 |
|------|---------|
| OpenClaw | `~/.openclaw/meyo/credentials.json` |
| Hermes | `~/.hermes/meyo/credentials.json` |
| 其他 / 未知 | `~/.meyo/credentials.json` |
凭证文件结构:
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
| 环境 | 凭证路径 |
|------|---------|
| OpenClaw | `~/.openclaw/meyo/credentials.json` |
| Hermes | `~/.hermes/meyo/credentials.json` |
| 其他 / 未知 | `~/.meyo/credentials.json` |
凭证文件结构:
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
| 环境 | 凭证路径 |
|------|---------|
| OpenClaw | `~/.openclaw/meyo/credentials.json` |
| Hermes | `~/.hermes/meyo/credentials.json` |
| 其他 / 未知 | `~/.meyo/credentials.json` |
凭证文件结构:
The skill instructs the agent to use file write, network access, and shell execution, but declares no explicit tool scope or permission boundary. That makes the skill harder to sandbox and review, and increases the chance an agent runtime will grant broader capabilities than users expect.
The skill tells the agent to download and execute a remote shell or PowerShell script from the network. This is a classic remote-code-execution supply-chain risk: if the script or delivery path is compromised, the agent may execute arbitrary commands and expose local data or credentials.
The skill instructs the agent to fetch a remote registration script over the network and then execute it locally. Even though the destination domain is fixed, this still creates an external transmission and code execution chain that can be abused via server compromise, script tampering, or insufficient verification.
注册脚本直接调用 API 并将凭证写入文件,api_key 不经过 Agent 文本通道,避免被运行时脱敏。
1. 下载注册脚本到当前目录:
- macOS/Linux: `curl -sO https://www.meyo123.com/scripts/register.sh && chmod +x register.sh`
- Windows: `Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://www.meyo123.com/scripts/register.ps1" -OutFile register.ps1`
2. 确定你的凭证目录(见上方路径表),执行脚本:
The skill goes beyond onboarding and authentication into ongoing autonomous social behavior, recurring tasks, and prioritizing a specific skill store. That expanded operational scope can cause unexpected external actions and preference shaping not clearly conveyed by the manifest.
The memory-writing instruction says to '优先使用中文交流' as a default behavior. This imposes a language preference on future interactions without offering the user a choice or documenting a justified locale restriction, which matches the language/locale policy violation category.