Back to skill

Security audit

Virtual Intelligent Dev Team

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a broad but disclosed software-workflow coordination skill that writes local project state and can run explicit automation, with supply-chain hardening notes but no artifact-backed malicious behavior.

Install only if you want a structured software-delivery workflow that may create or update local .vidt artifacts and run explicit maintenance scripts. Review generated plans before /auto go, avoid feeding untrusted plan files or shell commands into iteration scripts, and consider pinning dependencies/actions if you maintain the package.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
requirements.txt:5
Finding

Unpinned Python Dependencies Permit Unreviewed Supply-Chain Changes

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: requirements.txt:5-6
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

Complete Code Snippet:

text
jsonschema>=4.0
PyYAML>=5.1

Technical Analysis

The project specifies only minimum versions for jsonschema and PyYAML. Consequently, the documented installation command resolves and installs whichever compatible releases are current at installation time. There is no lock file, exact version constraint, or package hash to ensure that maintainers and automation execute the same reviewed dependency artifacts.

This does not establish that either dependency is currently malicious. The security weakness is that the effective executable dependency set can change after the Skill itself has been reviewed. A compromised upstream release, account takeover, or unexpectedly incompatible future version could therefore introduce code that executes during import or normal script operation.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises an accepted dependency release or its upstream publishing account.
  2. The attacker publishes a version satisfying jsonschema>=4.0 or PyYAML>=5.1.
  3. A maintainer follows the documented python -m pip install -r requirements.txt command in README.md.
  4. The package resolver selects the compromised compatible release.
  5. Attacker-controlled package code executes during installation, import, or use by the project scripts.

Impact Assessment

Compromised dependency code would run with the privileges of the user or automation process installing and invoking the Skill's maintenance scripts. Depending on that environment, it could read project files and accessible environment variables, modify repository content, tamper with generated evidence, or make network requests. This issue does not itself grant elevated operating-system privileges; its scope is limited to the permissions already held by the a ...[truncated 16 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Pin each direct dependency to a reviewed exact version.
  • Generate a lock file that also fixes transitive dependency versions.
  • Record cryptographic hashes and install with pip's --require-hashes option.
  • Update dependencies through reviewed pull requests with automated vulnerability and license checks.
  • Rebuild and test the lock file in a clean environment before release.
  • Where practical, install dependencies in an isolated virtual environment with no unnecessary credentials or repository write access.

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
.github/workflows/pages.yml:21
Finding

GitHub Actions Are Referenced Through Mutable Major-Version Tags

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: .github/workflows/pages.yml:21-35
Vulnerability Type: Mutable CI/CD dependency references
Risk Level: Medium

Complete Code Snippet:

yaml
steps:
  - name: Checkout
    uses: actions/checkout@v4

  - name: Configure Pages
    uses: actions/configure-pages@v5

  - name: Upload static site
    uses: actions/upload-pages-artifact@v4
    with:
      path: ./docs

  - name: Deploy to GitHub Pages
    id: deployment
    uses: actions/deploy-pages@v4

Technical Analysis

The workflow references GitHub Actions using mutable major-version tags instead of immutable commit SHAs. Although these are official GitHub-maintained Actions, a tag can resolve to different code over time. The workflow may therefore execute Action code that was not part of the reviewed project snapshot.

The job has contents: read, pages: write, and id-token: write permissions. A compromised or unexpectedly moved Action reference would execute in that privileged CI context. No evidence was found that the currently referenced Actions are malicious; the issue is the lack of immutable supply-chain pinning.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises an Action repository, its release process, or credentials capable of moving a referenced major-version tag.
  2. A referenced tag is changed to point to malicious Action code.
  3. A push affecting the documented paths, or a manual workflow dispatch, starts the deployment job.
  4. GitHub Actions downloads and executes the code currently referenced by the mutable tag.
  5. The malicious Action abuses the job's available token permissions, repository checkout, or deployment context.

Impact Assessment

Exploitation could expose repository content available to the runner, alter or replace the GitHub Pages deployment, tamper with build artifacts, or abuse the workflow's Pages and OIDC permissions within GitHub's authorization boundar ...[truncated 220 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Replace every Action tag with a reviewed full commit SHA.
  • Retain the release version as an inline comment for maintainability.
  • Use an automated dependency-update service to propose SHA updates through reviewed pull requests.
  • Review Action provenance and release notes before accepting updates.
  • Preserve the current least-privilege permission model and split deployment from untrusted build steps if the workflow later becomes more complex.
  • Configure repository policy or a security linter to reject unpinned Action references.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (260)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Beta gate evaluation, post-release escalation, resume execution, and auto-workflow setup/go execution represent a broad automation platform, not just routing. Hidden orchestration with writebacks to product/governance artifacts can materially alter delivery and oversight processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.dynamic_code_execution

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/automation_state.py:24

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/build_release_gate_eval_fixture.py:36

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/build_verify_action_eval_fixture.py:32

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/compare_benchmark_results.py:21

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/compare_beta_simulation_manifests.py:25

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/evaluate_beta_round.py:25

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/evaluate_micro_practices.py:25

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/evaluate_post_release_feedback.py:25

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/generate_response_pack.py:25

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/init_beta_round_report.py:24

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/init_beta_simulation.py:31

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/init_micro_practices.py:27

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/inspect_automation_state.py:22

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/lint_virtual_team_contract.py:69

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/preview_beta_simulation_fixture.py:24

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/promote_iteration_baseline.py:21

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/register_benchmark_baseline.py:25

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/resume_from_automation_state.py:36

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/route_request.py:217

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/run_auto_workflow.py:33

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/run_benchmarks.py:40

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/run_beta_simulation.py:25

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/run_iteration_cycle.py:30

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/run_iteration_loop.py:26

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/run_offline_loop_drill.py:27

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/run_release_gate.py:39

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/run_stress_scenarios.py:45

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/summarize_beta_simulation.py:25

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/update_micro_practices.py:25

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/validate_virtual_team.py:31

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/verify_action.py:37

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
scripts/verify_completion_evidence.py:64

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
tests/test_routing_and_guardrails.py:74