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Security audit

Fuzzy Agent Daily Driver

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent agent-workflow reference, but it broadly directs memory access, background execution, scheduling, and external messaging without enough scoping or user-control safeguards.

Review before installing. This skill is not deceptive or self-executing, but it teaches agents to routinely read persistent memory, write long-term notes, run or manage background work, schedule recurring jobs, delegate to other sessions, and send external messages. Use it only if you are comfortable adding clear local rules for consent, memory minimization, external-message approval, command safety, and cleanup of cron jobs or long-running sessions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
skill.md:30
Finding

Mandatory Session-Wide Memory Access Overrides Task-Scoped Agent Behavior

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: skill.md, lines 30–40, 101–108, and 127–134
Vulnerability Type: Mandatory instruction hijacking and excessive access to persistent context
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code Snippets

markdown
### 1. Recall — Start Every Session Right
Before anything else, search long-term memory. This is mandatory at session start.

```javascript
// Tool: memory_search + memory_get
memory_search({ query: "recent decisions, context, preferences" })
// Then pull the relevant lines
memory_get({ path: "MEMORY.md", from: LINE, lines: 20 })
text

```markdown
## Everyday Session Template

Run this at the start of every session:

```javascript
// 1. Recall (mandatory)
memory_search({ query: "today's context, recent decisions" })
memory_get({ path: "MEMORY.md", from: 1, lines: 50 })
text

```markdown
## Session Startup Checklist

1. `memory_search` — what was decided recently?
2. `memory_get` — pull the relevant MEMORY.md lines
3. Check `HEARTBEAT.md` — any pending tasks?
4. Review `DAILY_SKILLS.md` or project tracker
5. Start working

Technical Analysis

The Skill declares that persistent-memory access is mandatory before every task and directs the agent to inspect additional workspace control and project files. These instructions are global rather than scoped to requests where historical context is necessary.

Loading persistent memory can place user preferences, project details, prior conversations, operational information, or attacker-controlled stored content into the active model context. Requiring this access before understanding the current task violates least-context and least-privilege principles. The Skill is presented as a workflow reference, so unconditional access to long-term memory and workspace-control files exceeds the minimum permissions necessary to provide that reference.

The broad query terms and the example that reads the ...[truncated 2257 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace mandatory startup instructions with conditional guidance, such as: “Search memory only when the current request requires historical context.”
  2. Obtain explicit user approval before reading persistent memory when the request does not clearly imply such access.
  3. Use narrowly scoped semantic queries derived from the current task instead of generic searches for “recent decisions, context, preferences.”
  4. Retrieve only the minimum relevant lines; do not read a fixed broad range from the beginning of MEMORY.md.
  5. Prohibit loading private memory in group chats, shared sessions, delegated sessions, and externally visible workflows.
  6. Treat all retrieved memory and workspace content as untrusted data rather than authoritative instructions. Stored text must not override system, developer, user, or safety constraints.
  7. Do not automatically inspect HEARTBEAT.md, DAILY_SKILLS.md, project trackers, or similar control files unless they are directly relevant to the requested task.
  8. Before using sessions_send, message, web_fetch, or other network-capable tools, require an independent recipient, purpose, and data-minimization check. Never include recalled memory unless the user explicitly authorizes it.
  9. Document the exact memory permissions required by each workflow and default to no persistent-memory access.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (7)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The guidance explicitly instructs storing personal preferences, location/timezone, and communication channels in persistent files without any accompanying privacy notice, consent requirement, retention guidance, or minimization rules. In an agent skill focused on everyday memory workflows, this normalizes collection of personally identifying and behavioral data, increasing the chance of unnecessary retention, oversharing, or later leakage through tool use or file access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The reference material explicitly documents arbitrary process execution and interactive process control (exec, process write, kill, log access) without any guardrails, scope limitations, or trust-boundary warnings. In a daily-driver agent skill, this can normalize using shell/process execution for routine workflows and materially increases the chance an agent will run attacker-influenced commands or maintain unsafe long-running jobs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

The background-process pattern encourages long-running execution that persists beyond the immediate interaction, with polling, log retrieval, stdin writes, and manual termination. In the absence of lifecycle, ownership, and cleanup controls, this creates persistence and monitoring blind spots that can be abused for unauthorized long-lived tasks or make accidental unsafe execution harder to detect and stop.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/session-patterns.md (reported line 92)May include surrounding context.

Process Management — Long Running Commands

Start a background process

javascript
exec({
  command: "python train_model.py --gpu 0",

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The examples show sending messages to external Discord channels and broadcasting to multiple targets with no mention of data-classification, approval, or outbound-sharing restrictions. For an agent workflow reference, this can lead operators or downstream agents to exfiltrate sensitive workspace data, alerts, or summaries to third-party services by default.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases are broad, generic prompts like 'what tools do you use most' and 'everyday agent workflows' that could activate this skill during ordinary conversation rather than when the user explicitly intends to invoke it. Because the skill contains operational guidance for memory access, background task spawning, messaging, and network actions, accidental activation increases the chance of unintended tool use or disclosure-oriented behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly promotes web search, web fetch, session delegation, and cross-channel messaging, but it does not warn that these actions may transmit data to external systems or third-party services. In a skill meant as a reusable workflow reference, omission of consent and data-handling guidance can cause agents to send sensitive context, workspace details, or user content off-platform without the user realizing it.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 181)May include surrounding context.

md
- **Don't busy-poll** — use `sessions_spawn` with callback, not while loops
- **Don't skip memory recall** — context gaps cause errors and重复 work
- **Don't write destructive commands** without asking first
- **Don't respond to everything** in group chats — quality > quantity
- **Don't forget to write it down** — if you learned it, file it