Security audit

pixmind-image-compress

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill does what it claims: it uploads selected images to a documented cloud compression API and saves compressed copies without modifying originals.

Install this only if you are comfortable sending chosen images, including batch-selected folders, to Pixmind/Tencent-backed cloud processing. Avoid using it for sensitive, regulated, or private images unless that external processing is acceptable, and keep PIXMIND_API_KEY protected.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (4)

Lp3

Medium

Category: MCP Least Privilege
Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: The skill requires an API key and sends data to a remote compression endpoint, but it does not declare explicit permissions for network or environment access in a normal permission model. This creates a transparency and governance gap: users and reviewers may not realize the skill can read secrets from the environment and transmit image data off-host.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 98% confidence
Finding: The skill states it is cloud-powered, but it does not prominently warn that local image files are uploaded to a third-party service for processing. This is a real privacy and data-handling issue because users may supply sensitive photos, screenshots, or documents without understanding that their contents leave the local machine.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 92% confidence
Finding: When the input is a local file, the code base64-encodes the image and sends it to an external cloud compression service via `compressImage(body)` without any explicit warning, confirmation, or consent flow at the point of upload. Because local images often contain sensitive content or metadata, this can cause unintended disclosure of private data to a third party, especially in batch mode where many files may be uploaded automatically.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 91% confidence
Finding: The function sends both arbitrary request body content and a bearer API credential to a third-party cloud endpoint without any built-in disclosure, confirmation, or guardrails about external transmission. In an agent skill context, users may provide local image data, URLs, or metadata assuming local processing, so silent upload to a remote service creates a real data exposure and secret-use risk even if the code is not overtly malicious.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.env_credential_access

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical

Code: suspicious.env_credential_access
Location: pixmind-client.js:1