T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Error
- Location
clawprint-challenge.sh:125- Finding
Secret Key Disclosure Through an Unrestricted Server URL
- Content
View full analysis
&2 exit 1 fi } ``` ```bash response=$(curl -sf -X POST "${CLAWPRINT_SERVER_URL}/api/v1/validate" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"challenge_id\": \"${challenge_id}\", \"secret_key\": \"${CLAWPRINT_SECRET_KEY}\"}") ``` ### Technical Analysis The script verifies only that `CLAWPRINT_SERVER_URL` is nonempty. It does not require HTTPS, validate the hostname, restrict the destination to a trusted allowlist, reject embedded URL credentials, or otherwise bind the secret key to an expected ClawPrint server. The `validate` operation places `CLAWPRINT_SECRET_KEY` directly in the POST body and sends it to the configured URL. If an attacker can influence the process environment, deployment configuration, wrapper script, or command execution context, the attacker can redirect the request to an endpoint under their control. An HTTP URL would additionally expose the credential to network interception or modification. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker influences `CLAWPRINT_SERVER_URL`, for example by modifying an environment file, CI/CD variable, process environment, or invocation wrapper. 2. The value is changed to an attacker-controlled endpoint such as `http://attacker.example`. 3. A user or agent invokes: ```bash ./clawprint-challenge.sh validate ``` 4. The script sends a POST request to the attacker-con ...[truncated 786 chars]- Remediation
View remediation
&2; exit 1 ;; esac ``` 2. Parse and compare the hostname against an explicit allowlist of trusted ClawPrint servers. 3. Reject URLs containing embedded credentials, fragments, unexpected ports, or ambiguous encodings. 4. Pin the expected server URL in trusted configuration rather than accepting it from an untrusted runtime environment. 5. Prefer an authorization header over placing the secret in the JSON body, provided the server API supports it. 6. Prevent secrets from appearing in debug traces, process diagnostics, proxy logs, or error output. 7. Rotate `CLAWPRINT_SECRET_KEY` immediately if requests may already have been sent to an untrusted endpoint. 8. Consider certificate or public-key pinning in deployments where endpoint redirection or CA compromise is within the threat model. ]]>