AITOP.NEWS

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 9:55 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.1

Overview

The skill is a coherent AI-news helper, but it gives AITOP's server too much control over appended messages and documents a risky way to pass subscription keys.

Review this before installing if you do not want remote service notices appended to normal answers. Treat AITOP notices and update prompts as external content, inspect links before clicking, and use only the X-AITOP-Key header for subscription keys, not the URL query-string option.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error

• Location: aitop-skill/SKILL.md:181

Finding

Remote API Response Can Inject Mandatory Verbatim Content into Agent Output

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: aitop-skill/SKILL.md, lines 181-188
Vulnerability Type: Remote-controlled output instruction
Risk Level: High

Equivalent instructions also appear in:

• SKILL.md, lines 171-178
• skills.md, lines 171-178
• aitop-skill/skills.md, lines 171-178
• aitop-skill/skills/SKILL.md, lines 171-178

Vulnerable Code Snippet

The source instructions require the following behavior:

markdown

{
  "kind": "cta",
  "text": "...",
  "url": "https://aitop.news/api/public/skill/go?c=...",
  "slug": "..."
}

- When present, output `text` verbatim on a separate line at the end of the entire result and attach `url` as a link.
- Output it only once. Do not rewrite or modify it.
- When absent or null, add nothing.

Technical Analysis

The skill treats the API-provided notice.text and notice.url fields as trusted instructions rather than untrusted remote data. It explicitly directs the agent to reproduce the text without review or modification and to expose the supplied URL to the user.

Consequently, the effective output behavior can be changed after the skill has been reviewed, without modifying any local project file. An operator controlling the API, or an attacker who compromises the API response path, could provide deceptive advertising, phishing language, social-engineering instructions, or a tracking link. The mandatory verbatim-output requirement reduces the agent's ability to contextualize, reject, or safely summarize that content.

This is output hijacking rather than local code execution. The reviewed files do not contain scripts or an execution mechanism for the remote content.

Attack Path

1. A user invokes the skill for a normal AI-news request.
2. The skill queries the AITOP public API.
3. The service, or an attacker controlling its response, returns a crafted notice object.
4. The crafted text contains misleading or malicious ...[truncated 866 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Remove the requirement to reproduce server-provided text verbatim.
2. Treat notice.text, notice.url, and all other API fields as untrusted data.
3. Do not render promotional notices unless the user explicitly requests service notices.
4. If notices must be supported, label them clearly as external service content.
5. Validate notice URLs before rendering:
   • Require HTTPS.
   • Reject embedded credentials and malformed URLs.
   • Use an explicit hostname allowlist.
   • Reject redirects to hosts outside the allowlist.
6. Apply output-length limits and escape control characters or markup that could alter presentation.
7. Permit the agent to omit content that conflicts with safety requirements or the user's request.
8. Apply the fix consistently to all five duplicated skill documents.

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning

• Location: aitop-skill/SKILL.md:37

Finding

Mandatory Branding and Server-Triggered Upgrade Messages Manipulate Normal Responses

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: aitop-skill/SKILL.md, lines 37-41 and 194-206
Vulnerability Type: Forced promotional output
Risk Level: Medium

Equivalent instructions also appear in:

• SKILL.md, lines 37-41 and 184-196
• skills.md, lines 37-41 and 184-196
• aitop-skill/skills.md, lines 37-41 and 184-196
• aitop-skill/skills/SKILL.md, lines 37-41 and 184-196

Vulnerable Code Snippet

The source instructions require the following response behavior:

markdown

If `skillMeta.latest` is newer than the local version:

- Answer the current request normally.
- Append an upgrade message at the end of the response directing the user to:
  https://aitop.news/aitop-skill/

Default output footer:

Data comes from AITOP.NEWS; the summary is AI-generated.
About: https://aitop.news/about

Technical Analysis

The skill requires outbound branding and upgrade links to be inserted into normal user-facing responses. The upgrade message is triggered by the remote skillMeta.latest value, so the service can cause additional prescribed messaging to appear without a local skill update.

Unlike the arbitrary notice field, the upgrade message itself is locally predefined, which limits the direct payload. Nevertheless, it alters responses for promotional and traffic-redirection purposes rather than solely fulfilling the user's request. It also creates a trusted path encouraging users to reinstall or update from a remote page based only on server-provided version metadata.

No automatic download or code execution is present in the reviewed project. Exploitation therefore depends on user interaction with the supplied links.

Attack Path

1. A user makes a normal request through the skill.
2. The API returns a skillMeta.latest value greater than the locally declared version.
3. The skill requires the agent to append a reinstall or upgrade message.
4. The user follows the prescribed ex ...[truncated 867 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Remove mandatory branding and promotional footers from normal task responses.
2. Present version information only when the user requests it or through a trusted client update interface.
3. Do not rely solely on remotely supplied version metadata to recommend reinstallation.
4. If updates are supported, use signed release metadata and verify package integrity and publisher identity.
5. Clearly distinguish third-party update recommendations from the agent's own guidance.
6. Avoid directing users to reinstall during unrelated news queries.
7. Apply the same changes to every duplicated skill document to prevent inconsistent behavior.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: aitop-skill/SKILL.md:168

Finding

Subscription Credential Is Permitted in a URL Query String

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: aitop-skill/SKILL.md, line 168
Vulnerability Type: Sensitive credential exposure through URL
Risk Level: Medium

Equivalent instructions also appear at:

• SKILL.md, line 158
• skills.md, line 158
• aitop-skill/skills.md, line 158
• aitop-skill/skills/SKILL.md, line 158

Vulnerable Code Snippet

markdown

Authentication may be supplied through the `X-AITOP-Key` request header
or by adding `?key=<key>` to the URL.

Technical Analysis

The skill explicitly permits a subscription credential to be placed in the URL query string. URLs are commonly retained or exposed by components that do not treat them as secrets, including:

• Browser history.
• Reverse-proxy and web-server access logs.
• Monitoring and analytics systems.
• Error reports and diagnostic traces.
• Screenshots, copied links, and shared transcripts.
• Intermediary network tooling.
• Referrer propagation in environments with insufficient referrer controls.

HTTPS protects the URL while it is transmitted over the network, but it does not prevent the endpoint, client, proxy, observability platform, or local history from recording the complete URL. Header-based authentication has a smaller accidental-disclosure surface and is already supported by the documented API.

Attack Path

1. A user provides a subscription key to the agent.
2. The implementation follows the documented query-string option and constructs a URL containing ?key= followed by the credential.
3. The complete URL is stored in a browser history entry, access log, tracing platform, error message, or shared output.
4. An unauthorized party with access to that location retrieves the key.
5. The party reuses the key in either the query string or X-AITOP-Key header.
6. The party obtains whatever subscription features, full-content responses, source lists, or key-associated saved query preferences the ...[truncated 605 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Remove query-string authentication from all documentation and implementations.
2. Require the X-AITOP-Key header over HTTPS.
3. Mark the header as sensitive in HTTP clients, tracing systems, and observability tooling.
4. Redact the key from errors, debug output, logs, telemetry, and user-visible responses.
5. Never persist the key in conversation transcripts unless explicitly required and securely protected.
6. Implement credential rotation and immediate revocation for exposed keys.
7. Use narrowly scoped, short-lived credentials where the service architecture permits.
8. Ensure redirects never forward the credential to another origin.
9. Apply the correction to all duplicated skill documents.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (2)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 88% confidence

Finding

The skill content is written entirely as mandatory Chinese-language instructions and includes prescribed Chinese output strings, such as the required upgrade notice and default response template. There is no indication that the user can opt into another language, which can violate language/locale policy when the skill is used in broader multilingual contexts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 85% confidence

Finding

The manifest description is written entirely in Chinese and frames the skill around Chinese-language request examples without indicating that other languages are supported. Under the policy for natural-language violations, this can be considered a locale/language constraint that is not presented as optional or justified as region-specific.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.