T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:66
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party CLI Dependency## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 66-70 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party package installation **Risk Level**: Medium **Vulnerable Code**: ```markdown ### 2. Install the CLI ```bash pip install agentpatch ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions retrieve the latest available `agentpatch` package from the default Python package index without specifying an exact version or verifying an integrity hash. The audited project does not contain the package source code or a lock file, so the behavior of the installed CLI cannot be established from the reviewed artifact. This creates a supply-chain risk because the effective dependency can change after the Skill has been reviewed. A compromised maintainer account, malicious future release, or compromise of the distribution infrastructure could cause users to install code that differs from the version originally intended by the Skill author. This finding does not establish that the current `agentpatch` package is malicious. The vulnerability is the absence of version and integrity controls. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package publisher, publishing account, or dependency distribution channel. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version under the expected `agentpatch` package name. 3. A user follows the Skill instructions and runs `pip install agentpatch`. 4. The package installer retrieves the attacker-controlled release because no version or hash is pinned. 5. Malicious package installation hooks or subsequent CLI execution run under the privileges of the user performing the installation. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could execute attacker-controlled code with the installing user's privileges. Depending on the execution environment, that code could read files available to the user, access environment variables such as `AGENTPATCH_API_KEY`, modify user-level configuration, in ...[truncated 266 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions - Pin the CLI to a specifically reviewed release, for example `agentpatch==X.Y.Z`. - Provide cryptographic hashes and require hash verification during installation. - Maintain a reviewed lock file or constraints file for the package and its transitive dependencies. - Link to the package's verifiable source repository and release provenance. - Recommend installation in an isolated virtual environment rather than globally or with administrator privileges. - Use signed releases or package provenance attestations where available. - Establish a dependency update process that requires security review before changing the pinned version.