Ecommerce Automation

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 12, 2026 · 3:49 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This e-commerce automation skill is purpose-aligned and disclosed, but users should handle store credentials carefully and enable write actions gradually.

Install only if you are comfortable connecting it to live e-commerce systems. Start in monitoring or dry-run mode, use least-privilege API tokens, keep secrets out of YAML files and source control, require approval for price/order/listing changes, and verify audit logs and rollback before enabling auto-repricing, inventory sync, or fulfillment.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:66

Finding

Plaintext API Credential Configuration

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 66–69
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext sensitive credential storage
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

yaml

store:
  platform: "shopify"
  api_key: "shpat_xxxxx"
  store_url: "https://your-store.myshopify.com"

Technical Analysis

The quick-start example directs users to place a Shopify API credential directly in ecommerce-config.yaml. Although the displayed value is a placeholder rather than an active secret, users following the example are likely to replace it with a live token stored in plaintext.

The documentation does not instruct users to retrieve the credential from an environment variable or secret manager. It also provides no guidance concerning restrictive file permissions, source-control exclusions, output redaction, least-privilege token scopes, or credential rotation.

Attack Path

1. A user copies the example into ecommerce-config.yaml.
2. The user replaces shpat_xxxxx with a valid Shopify access token.
3. The plaintext configuration is committed to source control, copied into a backup, shared with another party, exposed in CI artifacts, or read by another local user.
4. An attacker extracts the token.
5. The attacker submits authenticated Shopify API requests using the stolen token.
6. The attacker accesses or modifies resources allowed by the token's configured scopes.

Impact Assessment

Exploitation requires access to a copy of the resulting configuration file or another location where its contents have been replicated. The attack does not inherently provide operating-system privilege escalation.

The attacker would inherit the Shopify API privileges assigned to the exposed token. Depending on its scopes, this could permit unauthorized access to store, product, inventory, order, or customer information and could allow unauthorized product, price, inventory, or order modifications. The affected scope is ...[truncated 68 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Replace the inline credential with an environment-variable or secret-manager reference, for example:

  yaml

  store:
    platform: "shopify"
    api_key_env: "SHOPIFY_ACCESS_TOKEN"
    store_url: "https://your-store.myshopify.com"
  

• Document secure injection of SHOPIFY_ACCESS_TOKEN at runtime without writing it into the workflow file.

• Add ecommerce-config.yaml and other local secret-bearing configuration files to .gitignore.

• Require restrictive filesystem permissions, such as owner-only read and write access.

• Use a dedicated token with only the minimum Shopify scopes required by the enabled workflow.

• Redact credentials from command output, logs, exceptions, audit records, and generated reports.

• Scan repositories and CI artifacts for accidentally committed credentials.

• Immediately revoke and rotate any token that may have been committed, shared, logged, or backed up insecurely.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 93% confidence

Finding

The skill explicitly describes write-capable automation such as auto-repricing, inventory synchronization, and auto-fulfillment, but it does not present a clear upfront warning that these actions can modify live store data and trigger external business operations. In an e-commerce context, users may enable workflows that change prices, stock counts, or order state across connected platforms, causing financial loss, overselling, customer impact, or erroneous fulfillment if misconfigured.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.