Social Publisher

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

The skill matches social media automation, but it asks for social-account tokens and can automatically post or engage publicly without enough guardrails shown.

Before installing, verify the actual workflow executor, use limited-scope tokens, keep secrets out of shared files, start with draft-only/preview mode, and require human approval for replies, follows, retweets, and cross-platform scheduled posts.

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

View on VirusTotal

Risk analysis

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

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ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation
High
What this means

A misfire could publicly post, reply, follow, or amplify content from the user's social accounts, causing reputational harm or platform enforcement.

Why it was flagged

These are public, account-mutating social actions. The visible artifact does not show per-action user approval, rate limits, or rollback controls for automated engagement.

Skill content
actions:
    - like: true
    - retweet: true
    - reply: "Thanks for sharing! Check out our latest: {{latest_post_url}}"
    - follow_back: true
Recommendation

Use draft/preview mode by default, require human approval for engagement actions, set rate limits, and test on low-risk accounts before enabling automation.

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ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse
Medium
What this means

Over-scoped or exposed tokens could let someone publish, delete, or engage from connected social accounts.

Why it was flagged

The skill expects social account credentials/tokens in a local config, but the provided metadata declares no primary credential or environment variable contract and the artifact does not explain token scope, storage protection, or rotation.

Skill content
Create `social-config.yaml`:

accounts:
  twitter:
    api_key: "..."
    api_secret: "..."
    access_token: "..."
    access_secret: "..."
Recommendation

Use least-privilege OAuth scopes, store secrets outside committed files, restrict file permissions, and revoke tokens immediately if the config is exposed.

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ASI08: Cascading Failures
Medium
What this means

A bad feed item, compromised source, or prompt-injected article could become scheduled posts across multiple public channels.

Why it was flagged

External source content can be transformed and scheduled across multiple platforms. The visible artifact does not show containment or mandatory review before generated content is propagated.

Skill content
Write once, auto-format for each platform ... content_generator:
  source: "rss" ... output:
    - draft: "Create draft in platform"
    - schedule: "Add to calendar"
Recommendation

Keep generated posts in draft until reviewed, restrict trusted sources, and add validation rules before cross-platform scheduling.

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ASI04: Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Low
What this means

Users may end up relying on an undeclared local command or workflow service that handles credentials and publishing.

Why it was flagged

The core examples invoke `clawhub`, but the declared required binaries list only `openclaw` and `curl`, and no install spec or code files are provided for review.

Skill content
requires:
      bins: ["openclaw", "curl"] ... clawhub workflow start blog-promotion
Recommendation

Verify the `clawhub` command source and workflow definitions before supplying tokens or starting publishing.

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ASI10: Rogue Agents
Low
What this means

Scheduled workflows could keep posting or sending reports after the user forgets they are enabled.

Why it was flagged

Recurring publishing/reporting is expected for this skill, but it means workflows may continue operating after setup unless the user manages stopping or expiration.

Skill content
"Generate daily content from RSS feeds" ... reporting:
  schedule: "0 8 * * mon"
Recommendation

Confirm there is a clear pause/stop command, use expiration dates for campaigns, and periodically audit active schedules.

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ASI07: Insecure Inter-Agent Communication
Low
What this means

Private campaign content or analytics could be shared with external services if those integrations are enabled.

Why it was flagged

The skill describes sending content or analytics through external AI/image, email, and Slack-style providers, but the visible artifact does not specify provider data boundaries or retention.

Skill content
generate_images: true  # DALL-E / Midjourney integration ... distribution:
    - email: "marketing@company.com"
    - slack: "#social-analytics"
Recommendation

Avoid feeding confidential content to external providers unless their data handling is approved, and limit report distribution to trusted recipients.