Tp2
- Category
- MCP Tool Poisoning
- Confidence
- 85% confidence
- Finding
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
- Content
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is mostly a normal Agnes AI image/video API helper, but it teaches the agent to persist an API key in shell startup files, which broadens credential exposure.
Review before installing if you are uncomfortable with an agent handling API keys or editing shell profile files. Prefer setting AGNES_API_KEY through a scoped secret manager or temporary environment variable, and do not let the agent append raw secrets to dotfiles unless you accept persistent credential exposure.
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).
API Key
| 步骤 | 操作 |
|------|------|
| 1 | 打开 [platform.agnes-ai.com](https://platform.agnes-ai.com/),注册/登录 |
| 2 | 左侧导航 → **API Keys** → **Create API Key** |
| 3 | 复制生成的 `sk-` 开头密钥 |
| 4a | **侦测环境**:`uname -s` 判 OS,`echo $SHELL` 判 shell |
| 4b | **配置命令**(据上一步结果选择):<br>• Linux/macOS + **zsh** → `echo 'export AGNES_API_KEY="sk-..."' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc`<br>• Linux + **bash** → `echo 'export AGNES_API_KEY="sk-..."' >> ~/.bashrc && source ~/.bashrc`<br>• macOS + **bash** → `echo 'export AGNES_API_KEY="sk-..."' >> ~/.bash_profile && source ~/.bash_profile`<br>• Windows + **PowerShell** → `Add-Content -Path $PROFILE -Value '$env:AGNES_API_KEY="sk-..."'`<br>• 其他环境 → 询问用户其 shell 配置文件名 |
| 5 | 验证:`curl -s https://apihub.agnes-ai.com/v1/chat/completions -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $AGNES_API_KEY" -d
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
# 提交
TASK_ID=$(curl -s https://apihub.agnes-ai.com/v1/video/generations \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AGNES_API_KEY" \
-d '{"model":"agnes-video-v2.0","prompt":"...","duration":5}' \
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
# 轮询(间隔 10-15 秒)
while true; do
resp=$(curl -s "https://apihub.agnes-ai.com/v1/video/generations/$TASK_ID" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AGNES_API_KEY")
status=$(echo "$resp" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('data',{}).get('status',''))")
progress=$(echo "$resp" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('data',{}).get('progress',0))")
The combination of Write and Bash permissions with instructions to modify shell profile files creates session persistence for a credential, causing the secret to remain available across future sessions and potentially accessible to later commands or skills. In context, persistence is not framed as malware, but it does increase blast radius if the environment is later compromised or the agent misuses its tooling.
description: 调用 Agnes AI 免费 API 生成图片/视频。从 AGNES_API_KEY 环境变量读取密钥。
allowed-tools:
- Read
- Write
- Bash
- AskUserQuestion
metadata:
The skill instructs users to persist an API key into shell profile files and immediately source them, which increases the chance of accidental secret exposure through shell history, shared profiles, backups, screenshots, or agent-mediated file access. Because the skill has Read/Write/Bash capabilities, normalizing persistent secret setup inside the workflow broadens the exposure surface beyond the immediate API call.
The verification step sends an authenticated request containing the user's bearer token to an external third-party service. Although that is the intended API usage, it is still a real external transmission of a secret-backed request and becomes more dangerous in an agent skill because users may be induced to run it before fully understanding data handling or trust boundaries.
| 3 | 复制生成的 `sk-` 开头密钥 |
| 4a | **侦测环境**:`uname -s` 判 OS,`echo $SHELL` 判 shell |
| 4b | **配置命令**(据上一步结果选择):<br>• Linux/macOS + **zsh** → `echo 'export AGNES_API_KEY="sk-..."' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc`<br>• Linux + **bash** → `echo 'export AGNES_API_KEY="sk-..."' >> ~/.bashrc && source ~/.bashrc`<br>• macOS + **bash** → `echo 'export AGNES_API_KEY="sk-..."' >> ~/.bash_profile && source ~/.bash_profile`<br>• Windows + **PowerShell** → `Add-Content -Path $PROFILE -Value '$env:AGNES_API_KEY="sk-..."'`<br>• 其他环境 → 询问用户其 shell 配置文件名 |
| 5 | 验证:`curl -s https://apihub.agnes-ai.com/v1/chat/completions -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $AGNES_API_KEY" -d '{"model":"agnes-2.0-flash","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}'`,返回含 `choices` 即成功 |
---
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -s https://apihub.agnes-ai.com/v1/{ENDPOINT} \
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# 提交
TASK_ID=$(curl -s https://apihub.agnes-ai.com/v1/video/generations \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AGNES_API_KEY" \
-d '{"model":"agnes-video-v2.0","prompt":"...","duration":5}' \
The natural-language content in this file forces a single language presentation and does not mention any user-selectable language option or justified region-specific scope. Under the policy, language-specific instructions can be a violation when the skill does not provide opt-in or document the constraint.
This markdown file includes multiple curl examples that send an Authorization header using $AGNES_API_KEY to a remote API service. While the examples are normal for API usage, the documentation does not include any warning about keeping the API key secret, avoiding shell history leakage, or protecting credentials when running the commands.