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Security audit

AI元认知置信度追踪器

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill has a coherent confidence-checking purpose, but it sends both questions and answers to an external MiniMax model despite documenting that question context is not uploaded.

Review before installing, especially in environments where prompts may contain private code, credentials, business data, or personal information. This skill can send question and answer content to MiniMax, uses a local API key, and relies on the local mmx command; it should be revised to disclose that data flow, minimize transmitted content, avoid inheriting unrelated environment variables, and make any recurring research behavior explicitly user-directed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
confidence_checker.py:111
Finding

Question Context Is Undisclosedly Transmitted to an External Model Provider

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
confidence_checker.py:111
Finding

Untrusted Content Can Manipulate the TRUE/FALSE Confidence Evaluator

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (11)

Env Variable Harvesting

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Copying the entire process environment into a child process can expose unrelated secrets such as tokens, proxy credentials, and service configuration to the invoked executable. Because the child is an external CLI resolved from the local environment, this broad secret propagation increases the impact of binary hijacking, plugin abuse, or local compromise.

Content

Scanner excerpt · confidence_checker.py (reported line 57)May include surrounding context.

python
content = msg.get("content", "")
        cmd.extend(["--message", f"{role}: {content}"])

    env = os.environ.copy()
    env["MINIMAX_API_KEY"] = api_key

    result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60, env=env)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The skill appears to imply operational capabilities such as environment access, file reading, and shell-like behavior without explicitly declaring any tool scope or permission boundaries. That creates a transparency and governance gap: an agent or reviewer cannot reliably determine what the skill is allowed to do, increasing the risk of unintended local access or execution if the platform infers capabilities from content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The manifest description and heading are written entirely in Chinese and frame the skill's behavior around a Chinese-speaking persona ("小Z") without indicating that language is configurable or user-selected. This is a natural-language locale policy concern because the skill appears to impose a specific language context by default rather than offering a choice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The manifest frames the skill as a simple confidence-tagging module, but the body expands it into recurring GitHub searches, paper/code tracking, and reporting tasks. This scope expansion is dangerous because it can trigger networked research, data collection, and ongoing behavior that users and policy controls did not explicitly authorize.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The module description and later user-facing CLI messages are written in Chinese only, and the skill behavior is framed specifically for '小Z' with no indication that users may choose another language. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in is a natural-language locale violation unless the restriction is explicitly justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill's stated purpose is local confidence labeling, but it silently sends the user's question and answer to an external model for correctness judgment. That creates an unexpected outbound data flow, which can leak sensitive prompts or responses and materially changes the security/privacy profile of the skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The code reads credentials from the environment and a user config file, then launches an external process using those credentials. For a confidence-checking helper, these capabilities are broader than the stated purpose and increase the blast radius if the binary, PATH, or runtime environment is compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill accesses API credentials and performs an outbound model call through an external CLI without clear user-facing disclosure. In security-sensitive environments, undisclosed credential use and data egress are dangerous because they can expose sensitive inputs and make review of data handling much harder.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · confidence_checker.py (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

python
env = os.environ.copy()
    env["MINIMAX_API_KEY"] = api_key

    result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60, env=env)

    if result.returncode == 0:
        try:

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The privacy section minimizes risk by stating that only answer text is uploaded and full conversations are not recorded, but the workflow still sends generated content to an external model for evaluation. Even partial outputs can contain sensitive, proprietary, or user-derived information, so the privacy claim may cause users to underestimate real data exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The docstring and module comments describe a self-consistency approach: generating two answers to the same question and comparing them. However, check_consistency constructs a TRUE/FALSE evaluation prompt about the supplied answer and sends it to a model judge, which is a different method with different semantics and risks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.