T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- scripts/gen_post.py:2
- Finding
- Unbounded Third-Party Dependency Resolution## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/gen_post.py`, lines 2-7 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party dependencies **Risk Level**: Medium ```python # /// script # requires-python = ">=3.10" # dependencies = [ # "google-genai>=1.0.0", # "pillow>=10.0.0", # ] # /// ``` ### Technical Analysis The script declares `google-genai` and `pillow` using open-ended minimum-version constraints. The documented `uv run` workflow can resolve and install any future release satisfying these constraints. No lockfile, exact version, package hash, or upper version boundary is present in the audited project. Consequently, the code ultimately installed and imported when the Skill runs may differ from the dependency versions originally reviewed. If a permitted future release is compromised, malicious package installation or import-time code could execute with the privileges of the user running the Skill. This finding concerns supply-chain integrity. The audited source does not itself contain a malicious dependency, and exploitation requires compromise of a dependency release or its distribution channel. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the publisher account, release process, or package-distribution path for a declared dependency. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version satisfying `google-genai>=1.0.0` or `pillow>=10.0.0`. 3. A user invokes the documented command through `uv run` in an environment without a trusted lockfile or cached reviewed version. 4. The resolver selects and installs the malicious compatible release. 5. Malicious installation or import-time code executes when the script imports the affected package. 6. The malicious code operates with the invoking user's permissions and can access resources available to the process. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution under the invoking user's account. The resulting scope may include ...[truncated 352 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin each dependency to an exact, reviewed version rather than using an open-ended lower bound. 2. Generate and commit a lockfile that records the complete transitive dependency graph. 3. Require package hashes or equivalent integrity verification during dependency installation. 4. Install dependencies only from an explicitly configured, trusted package index. 5. Update dependencies through a controlled review process that includes vulnerability scanning and verification of publisher and release provenance. 6. Run the Skill with least privilege and expose only the environment variables and filesystem paths required for image generation. 7. Where supported, use a restricted virtual environment or container to limit the impact of a compromised dependency.