Security audit

feapder

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent feapder coding helper, but users should be careful because its bundled upstream reference files include unsafe Redis parsing and credential-handling examples.

Install only if you want a feapder 1.9.2 coding reference. Do not run vendored reference code blindly, do not paste real cookies or passwords into examples, avoid untrusted Redis task/cache data, and keep debug Redis keys and database writes isolated from production.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands

Findings (10)

eval() call detected

High

Category: Dangerous Code Execution
Content: def get_task_from_redis(self): tasks = self._redisdb.zget(self._task_table, count=self._task_limit) tasks = [eval(task) for task in tasks] return tasks def get_todo_task_from_mysql(self):
Confidence: 99% confidence
Finding: tasks = [eval(task) for task in tasks]

eval() call detected

High

Category: Dangerous Code Execution
Content: log.info("无response缓存重新下载") response_obj = self.get_response(save_cached=save_cached) else: response_dict = eval(response_dict) response_obj = Response.from_dict(response_dict) return response_obj
Confidence: 99% confidence
Finding: response_dict = eval(response_dict)

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

Confidence: 94% confidence
Finding: DebugSpider emits a warning stating that debug mode will not write data, but when save_to_db=True it only skips replacing ITEM_PIPELINES and therefore can retain the application's normal persistence pipelines. This creates a misleading safety guarantee: developers may run a supposedly non-persistent debug session against production-like settings and unintentionally write records or trigger side effects in downstream storage.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High

Confidence: 99% confidence
Finding: Response cache loading uses Redis-backed data as executable input via eval(), creating a direct code-execution path from cache storage into application runtime. In a scraping framework, Redis is often shared infrastructure, so compromise or poisoning of cache entries can lead to full process takeover.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 96% confidence
Finding: The documentation explicitly shows supplying a database password on the command line. Command-line arguments are commonly exposed through shell history, process listings, audit logs, and screenshots, so this can leak credentials to other local users or logging systems. In the context of a developer CLI guide, this is more dangerous because readers are likely to copy-paste the example directly into real environments.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 89% confidence
Finding: The documentation recommends storing MySQL credentials in environment variables but does not mention that these values are sensitive or how to protect them. Environment variables are often inherited by child processes, can be exposed in CI/CD logs, crash dumps, shell init files, and shared user environments, so presenting this without safeguards promotes insecure secret handling. The skill context increases risk because it is operational guidance aimed at developers configuring real database access.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 98% confidence
Finding: The curl example contains a full Cookie header with what appears to be live session tokens and gives no warning to redact authentication material before sharing or pasting requests. Session cookies can enable account/session hijacking if reused, and documentation that normalizes copying such data into terminals or tickets materially increases accidental credential exposure. In a debugging skill, this is especially risky because users are encouraged to paste captured traffic from browsers and proxies.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 80% confidence
Finding: Debug mode forces DELETE_KEYS=True in __debug_custom_setting__, and later run() deletes tables matching self._redis_key + "*". Because __init__ derives the debug redis key by appending "_debug" to a caller-provided redis_key without validating scope, this can cause broad Redis key cleanup that may remove more state than an operator expects, especially in shared Redis environments.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 97% confidence
Finding: This finding is the same underlying issue as the eval() call: Redis task data is treated as executable Python code without disclosure or safety controls. In a spider framework, task payloads often originate from external queues or shared systems, so unsafe deserialization in this context materially increases the likelihood of remote code execution.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 91% confidence
Finding: The debug log prints the full request URL, method, and request arguments, which can include headers, cookies, auth data, and proxy settings. This can expose session tokens, credentials, or other sensitive data into logs, creating a secondary disclosure channel even if the network request itself is legitimate.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.dynamic_code_execution

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical

Code: suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location: references/vendor/feapder-1.9.2/feapder/core/spiders/task_spider.py:360

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical

Code: suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location: references/vendor/feapder-1.9.2/feapder/network/request.py:527