T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:20- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party CLI Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 20-27
Vulnerability Type: Unverified and mutable third-party dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
markdown Requires [beeper-cli](https://github.com/foeken/beeper-cli). ## Install beeper-cli Download from [releases](https://github.com/foeken/beeper-cli/releases), or build: ```bash go install github.com/foeken/beeper-cli@latesttext ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions direct users to download executable releases or run `go install` against a third-party GitHub repository using the mutable `@latest` version selector. The skill does not pin a reviewed version or immutable commit and provides no checksum, signature, provenance, or artifact-verification procedure. Consequently, the executable installed when these instructions are followed can differ from the dependency that existed when the skill was audited. A compromise of the upstream repository, maintainer account, release process, or distribution artifacts could introduce malicious code without requiring any modification to this project. The dependency is especially sensitive because the documented workflow provides it with access to `BEEPER_ACCESS_TOKEN` and uses it to access private chats, messages, and attachments. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the upstream repository, a maintainer account, or its release pipeline. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release that becomes the version resolved by `@latest`, or replaces an unverified downloadable artifact. 3. A user follows the documented installation instructions. 4. The malicious executable runs with the installing user's local privileges. 5. During installation or later use, it reads `BEEPER_ACCESS_TOKEN` from the environment. 6. It can then exfiltrate the token or use the authenticated Beeper API access to read private communications, download attachments, or perform supported account actions. ### Impact Assessment Successful ...[truncated 512 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace
@latestwith a specifically reviewed, immutable release version or commit hash. - Publish expected SHA-256 checksums for downloadable artifacts and require verification before execution.
- Prefer signed releases and document signature verification, including the trusted signing identity or key fingerprint.
- Use dependency provenance or reproducible-build verification where available.
- Periodically review pinned versions and update them through a controlled security-review process.
- Run the CLI with least privilege and prevent unrelated secrets from being present in its environment.
- Scope or rotate
BEEPER_ACCESS_TOKENwhere supported, and revoke it immediately if dependency compromise is suspected. - Document the exact trusted download URL and avoid installation flows that automatically resolve mutable releases.
- Replace
