T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Error
- Location
scripts/test_nano_banana_2.py:62- Finding
API Key Disclosure and SSRF Through Untrusted Image Result URLs
- Content
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bytes: if "b64_json" in item and isinstance(item["b64_json"], str): return base64.b64decode(item["b64_json"]) url_value = item.get("url") if isinstance(url_value, str) and url_value: resp = client.get(url_value, timeout=60) resp.raise_for_status() return resp.content raise RuntimeError("响应中未包含 b64_json 或 url") ``` The client passed to this function is initialized with the API key as a default header: ```python with httpx.Client(headers=_build_headers(api_key), follow_redirects=True) as client: ``` The header construction is: ```python def _build_headers(api_key: str) -> dict[str, str]: return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {api_key}"} ``` ### Technical Analysis The image-generation service controls the `url` field returned in its JSON response. The script performs a GET request to that URL using the same `httpx.Client` that has the API key configured as a default `Authorization` header. No validation is performed on the URL scheme, hostname, resolved IP address, port, or redirect destination. Consequently, a compromised or malicious API response can direct the client to: - An attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint, potentially receiving the bearer credential. - Loopback or private-network services. - Link-local cloud metadata services. - Unexpected non-image resources. - Redirect chains whose destinations have not been independently validated. The request also downloads the complete response into memory without enforcing an explicit size limit. This creates an additional resource-exhaustion risk if the destinatio ...[truncated 1584 chars]- Remediation
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