T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
scripts/generate_image.py:3- Finding
Unpinned Runtime Dependencies Create a Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
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=3.10" # dependencies = [ # "google-genai>=1.0.0", # "pillow>=10.0.0", # ] # /// ``` ### Technical Analysis The inline dependency metadata specifies only minimum versions for `google-genai` and `pillow`. It does not impose upper bounds, lock exact reviewed versions, or verify package hashes. When the script is executed through a compatible dependency-resolving runner such as the documented `uv run` workflow, the resolver may install a newer release that did not exist when the Skill was audited. Python packages can execute code during installation or import. Consequently, compromise of a dependency release or its distribution channel could turn an otherwise legitimate script invocation into arbitrary code execution. The audit did not find a currently embedded malicious dependency or an alternative package source. This finding concerns the absence of reproducible, integrity-verified dependency resolution. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a future compatible release of `google-genai`, `pillow`, or the package distribution channel. 2. The malicious release still satisfies the open-ended `>=` version constraint. 3. A user runs `generate_image.py` using a runner that automatically resolves the inline dependencies. 4. The runner downloads and installs the compromised release. 5. Malicious code executes during installation or when the script imports the package. 6. The payload operates with the privileges of the user running the Skill. ### Impact Assessment A compromised dependency could execute arbitrary code with the invoking user's privileges. Depending on that user's environment, the payload could access project files, environment variables such as `GEMINI_API_KEY`, writable user data, and network ...[truncated 281 chars]- Remediation
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", # "pillow==", # ] ``` 2. Generate and commit a lockfile containing the complete transitive dependency graph. 3. Use hash verification for downloaded distributions where the package-management workflow supports it. 4. Configure dependency resolution to use a trusted package index explicitly. 5. Update dependencies through a controlled process involving security review, automated vulnerability scanning, and regression testing. 6. Run image generation in a restricted environment with minimal filesystem access and only the required environment variables. ]]>