T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:22- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Pillow Dependency
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 22
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency installation
Risk Level: LowVulnerable Code Snippet:
markdown - Python 3 + Pillow (`pip install pillow`)Technical Analysis
The skill directs the user or agent to install Pillow from the Python Package Index without specifying a reviewed version or validating an integrity hash. The package resolved by
pip install pillowcan therefore change over time, making installations non-reproducible and automatically trusting whichever release the package index currently serves.This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that Pillow itself is malicious. If the package distribution channel or a future release were compromised, package installation could execute attacker-controlled installation or build logic with the privileges of the account running
pip. The instruction does not use an explicitly unsafe or unofficial source, and no dependency-confusion package name or known malicious dependency was identified, so the practical risk is low.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the upstream Pillow distribution account, release process, or package-index delivery path.
- The attacker publishes or serves a malicious release under the legitimate package name.
- A user or agent follows the skill instruction and runs
pip install pillow. - Pip resolves the unpinned dependency to the compromised release.
- Malicious installation, build, or imported runtime code executes in the installation environment.
This path depends on a separate upstream supply-chain compromise; the audited project does not itself retrieve a custom remote payload or contain malicious executable code.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could execute arbitrary code with the permissions of the user running
pip. Depending on that user's privileges and environment, this could permit access to ...[truncated 458 chars]- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
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Pin Pillow to a specifically reviewed version in a dependency file, for example:
text Pillow==REVIEWED_VERSION -
Generate and enforce cryptographic hashes using a lock workflow such as
pip-tools, then install with hash verification:bash python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt -
Install the dependency inside a dedicated virtual environment rather than the system Python environment:
bash python -m venv .venv .venv/bin/python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt -
Configure an approved package index explicitly and avoid untrusted mirrors or additional indexes.
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Periodically review and update the pinned version after checking release provenance and known vulnerabilities. Regenerate verified hashes whenever the version changes.
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Document that dependency installation must run as an unprivileged user and must not use
sudoor an administrator account.
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