T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
README.md:7- Finding
Mutable ClawHub Package Is Downloaded and Executed Through npx
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This appears to be a real multi-agent coding helper, but it should be reviewed because it can broadly spawn agents that change code, run commands, and push branches without strong confirmation gates.
Install only if you want a broad autonomous coding coordinator. Use it in a trusted or isolated repository, avoid exposing unrelated secrets, pin installer and test dependencies where possible, and require explicit approval before running project commands, starting servers, pushing branches, or creating PRs.
README.md:7Mutable ClawHub Package Is Downloaded and Executed Through npx
agents/stage.md:8Stage Agent May Download and Execute an Unpinned Playwright Package
YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
*Architect** | System design, API contracts, types |
| **Spark** | Frontend — components, hooks, state |
| **Conduit** | Backend — API routes, DB ops, auth |
| **Prism** | UI/UX — visual polish, layout, animation |
| **Oracle** | Database — queries, migrations, schema |
| **Sentinel** | Security — vulnerabilities, auth review |
| **Forge** | Testing — unit, integration, coverage |
| **Bloodhound** | Debugging — root cause analysis |
| **Sage** | Code review — logic errors, edge cases |
| **Navigator** | DevOps — CI/CD, deploy safety |
| **Scribe** | Documentation — specs, API docs |
| **Releaser** | Git — commit, push, PR creation |
| **Scraper** | Data acquisition — APIs, websites |
| **Stage** | Browser testing — Playwright, E2E |
## How It Works
1. You ask OpenClaw to build/fix/review something
2. Nola plans the work and spawns specialist sub-agents
3. Agents run in parallel where possible
4. Results flow back, Nola dispatches next steps (review, polish,
YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
sessions_spawn.Use the sessions_spawn tool to dispatch squad members:
{
"task": "[AGENT ROLE PREAMBLE]\n\n[DETAILED TASK]",
"label": "agent-name",
"model": "model-id"
}
Every dispatch MUST include:
Deliverables: [specific files to create/modify]
YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
# Bloodhound — Debugging Specialist
You are BLOODHOUND — debugging and incident specialist. You trace from symptom to root cause. You don't guess — you trace, measure, and prove.
You are NOT a discovery tool. If the task is "find where X lives" or "understand how Y is structured" with no known bug or error, say so and recommend dispatching architect instead. You exist for bugs, errors, and incidents.
## How You Work
1. Gather symptoms — what's observed vs expected
2. Form 2-3 hypotheses ranked by likelihood
3. Test cheapest first — logs, config, recent changes before deep-diving
4.
The README instructs users to execute npx clawhub@latest install nola-squad, which fetches and runs the latest published package version at install time. Because the version is not pinned, users are exposed to supply-chain risk if a malicious or compromised release of clawhub is published later.
The activation description is very broad: the skill is presented as applicable whenever a user needs software built, bugs fixed, code reviewed, or features implemented. In an agentic system, overly generic activation criteria can cause the skill to be invoked in more contexts than intended, increasing the chance of unnecessary code execution, sub-agent spawning, or interaction with sensitive repositories.
The manifest description advertises the skill for a wide range of generic engineering tasks, making it likely to be invoked by ordinary software-related prompts. Because the skill is designed to rapidly delegate work to multiple agents, overbroad invocation guidance can lead to unintended activation and excessive autonomous action.
The activation criteria are extremely broad and cover common software-development requests such as building features, fixing bugs, reviewing code, and writing tests. In a skill-routing system, this increases the chance of accidental or unnecessary activation, which can trigger autonomous agent dispatch and unintended codebase actions without sufficiently specific user intent.
The instruction to avoid narrating actions and minimize text between tool calls can suppress user-visible disclosure of code-changing behavior, reducing transparency and making it harder for users to notice or interrupt unsafe modifications. In an agent that is explicitly empowered to design and write production code, this increases the risk of silent or insufficiently explained changes being applied without adequate user awareness.
The rule 'Do NOT narrate your actions. Just do the work.' suppresses user-facing explanation during debugging and code changes. In an agent that investigates incidents and writes fixes, this can hide impactful actions, reduce opportunities for user review, and prevent surfacing warnings before modifying code or configuration.
The instruction 'Do NOT narrate your actions. Just do the work.' discourages user-facing disclosure in a database-specialist skill that may propose migrations or operational SQL. In context, this reduces transparency around potentially impactful operations such as locking migrations, destructive schema changes, or risky query modifications, making it easier for hazardous actions to be presented without adequate warning or justification.
The instruction 'Do NOT narrate your actions. Just do the work.' suppresses user-facing disclosure about what the agent is doing, which can reduce transparency and make it harder for users or overseers to detect unsafe, out-of-scope, or unintended modifications. In a multi-agent coding skill, this is more dangerous because the agent is empowered to inspect and modify project files, so reduced disclosure weakens human oversight during code changes.
This skill explicitly instructs the agent to push branches and create pull requests, which are remote, state-changing actions, but it does not include a clear user-consent or confirmation requirement before modifying a remote repository. In an agent setting, that increases the risk of unintended code publication, accidental disclosure of sensitive changes, or repository tampering if the task scope is misunderstood or the agent is prompted maliciously.
The skill explicitly instructs the agent to fetch external data and write structured results to files while also telling it not to narrate its actions. That combination removes user visibility into network access and file creation, which can enable undisclosed persistence of scraped content, accidental overwrites, or storage of sensitive data without clear consent or review.
The skill tells the agent to execute npx playwright test, which may fetch and run an unpinned package version if Playwright is not already installed locally. In an agentic context, this creates a supply-chain and unintended code-execution risk because the exact code being executed is not constrained or reviewed.
The skill explicitly directs the agent to run a local build/test command such as cargo check, tsc --noEmit, or npm run build without any user-facing warning or consent gate. Even though these are common developer commands, they can execute untrusted project-defined scripts or tooling in the local workspace, which may trigger unintended code execution or side effects when analyzing adversarial repositories.
The skill explicitly instructs the agent to check for a dev server, start it if absent, and run browser tests, all of which execute local processes. While normal for a browser-testing skill, the lack of any warning, confirmation gate, or execution boundary increases the chance that an autonomous agent will start services and run code in a local environment without the user's informed consent.