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Security audit

launch-bnb-token-on-flap

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill mostly matches its token-launch purpose, but it can guide an agent into irreversible crypto transactions using unverified vault contracts and an unpinned npm install.

Review the final transaction carefully before signing, especially `to`, `chainId`, `quoteToken`, `quoteAmt`, `beneficiary`, `vaultFactory`, and `vaultData`. Prefer official vault factories, avoid custom factory addresses unless you independently verify them, and install dependencies from a pinned, trusted environment rather than running a fresh unpinned npm install during a token launch.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
references/preflight.md:8
Finding

Unpinned npm Dependency Installation Enables Supply-Chain Code Execution

Content
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/dev/null && echo OK || echo MISSING ``` If missing, install it: ```bash npm install viem ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs the Agent to install `viem` without specifying an exact version, lockfile, package integrity hash, trusted registry, or lifecycle-script policy. Consequently, the package and its transitive dependencies are resolved dynamically at execution time. This installation is necessary only when `viem` is unavailable, but resolving a mutable latest version is not the minimum-risk method required for the Skill's transaction-construction functionality. npm packages and transitive dependencies can execute lifecycle scripts during installation. A compromised package release, dependency, registry account, registry mirror, or local npm configuration could therefore turn this instruction into arbitrary local code execution. The command also does not use `npm ci` or `--ignore-scripts`, and the reviewed project contains no lockfile establishing a reproducible dependency graph. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a future `viem` release, one of its resolved dependencies, the configured npm registry, or a registry account. 2. The Skill checks for `viem` and determines that it is missing. 3. Following the documented workflow, the Agent runs `npm install viem`. 4. npm retrieves the currently resolved package graph rather than a reviewed, immutable version. 5. A malicious package lifecycle script executes during installation. 6. The payload runs with the operating-system permissions of the Agent or user that invoked npm. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could execute arbitrary commands with the invoking user's privileges. Depending on the execution environment, the malicious package could ...[truncated 475 chars]
Remediation
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``` 2. Include and review a lockfile, then use reproducible installation: ```bash npm ci ``` 3. Disable lifecycle scripts where they are unnecessary: ```bash npm ci --ignore-scripts ``` 4. Document and enforce the expected npm registry, and reject unexpected registry overrides. 5. Verify package integrity through the committed lockfile and periodically audit the pinned dependency graph. 6. Prefer requiring callers to provide a preinstalled, approved dependency environment rather than modifying the environment automatically. 7. Never run dependency installation as root or another privileged account. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/vault-factory.md:16
Finding

Unverified Vault Factories Can Be Inserted into Financial Transaction Calldata

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep